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ADVANCING THE CULTURAL STUDY OF THE 
LAWYER: DEVELOPING THREE 
PHILOSOPHICAL CLAIMS AND INTRODUCING 
A NEW COMPARATIVE NORMATIVE INQUIRY* 
RAKESH K. ANANDt 
ABSTRACT 
In America, law is a cultural practice, a type of social activity 
that generates a complete world of meaning. As such, it makes 
behavioral demands on those who participate in its form of 
experience. That is, it requires that those who take up its way of 
life act in certain ways. This fact—that law has an innate 
normativity, or an inherent ethics—is the organizing principle of 
the cultural study of the lawyer, a project that considers the 
implications of this condition for our thinking about law and about 
the work of law's most representative figures, namely lawyers. 
This Article builds upon previous writing in the project and 
pursues two natural consequent lines of inquiry. First, it provides a 
more detailed account of three philosophical claims that the 
cultural study of the lawyer has made, either explicitly or 
implicitly, the purpose of which is to clarify certain intellectual 
positions of the project. Second, moving forward from the cultural 
study of the lawyer's earlier exploration of how, at the most basic 
level, the behavioral demands of law differ from those associated 
with the moral form of experience, this Article begins a parallel 
discourse, reflecting on the behavioral demands of law and those 
of the cultural practice of economics, again specifically focusing 
on fundamental principles and their differential character. As with 
the earlier consideration of legal and moral prescription, the aim 
of this analysis is to make clear the distinction between the two 
cultural practices' requirements on conduct—an analysis that in 
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turn shows that, at his or her core, a lawyer is not an economic 
person (and therefore not a businessperson). Because the cultural 
study of the lawyer may be unfamiliar to some, this Article begins 
with an overview of the project, emphasizing in particular its 
intellectual setting and genealogy. 
INTRODUCTION 
In America, law is at the center of political life.' Politics in 
America begins with the rule of law. As is the nature of 
fundamental political commitment, the American dedication to the 
rule of law expresses itself in a full range of political conduct. 
When the country looks abroad and engages the community of 
nations, it preaches the rule of law, a phenomenon that holds true 
whether its behavior takes the form of diplomacy2 or war.3  
Internally, Americans structure their lives and resolve their 
disputes according to law, and do so regardless of how mundane or 
profound the matter is.4 The rule of law tells Americans whether 
they may ship wine across state borders.5 It also decides the 
identity of the President.6 
This understanding of the place of law in American politics has a deep 
history. See, e.g., THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776), reprinted in COMMON 
SENSE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN, AND OTHER ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
PAINE 49 (Meridian Books 1984) ("[I]n America the Law is King."); ALEXIS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 256 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba 
Winthrop trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835). For the important modern 
account, at least in law, see PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. 
MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA (1997) [hereinafter KAHN, THE 
REIGN OF LAW]. 
2 For one discussion of the American promotion of democracy abroad, 
placed in the context of the Obama administration, see Peter Baker, Quieter 
Approach to Spreading Democracy Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2009, at 
WK1. 
3 The Bush administration famously used the rhetoric of the promise of 
democracy in the war with Iraq. See, e.g., President's News Conference with 
President Vaira Vike-Freiberga of Latvia, President Arnold Ruutel of Estonia, 
and President Valdas Adamkus of Lithuania in Riga, 41 WKLY. COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 767, 771 (May 7, 2005) (President Bush speaking of freedom as 
"universal" and of "the idea of countries helping others become free" as simply 
"rational foreign policy"). 
4 Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has spoken of "our national 
obsession with the law." ANTONIN SCALIA, A MNITER OF INTERPREIATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (1997). 
See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005). 
6 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Former Vice President and 
Democratic nominee Al Gore's statement concerning the Supreme Court 
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This circumstance—of a deep-seated devotion to the rule of 
law—points to a basic truth about the nature of law in the United 
States. It is a cultural form,' no different in kind than religion, 
science, or art.8 Law represents an entire world of meaning, rich in 
significance for those who embrace its universe. The foundational 
tenet of this modus vivendi is immediately recognizable. Law is the 
voice of "We the People."9 Other elements, which all draw forth 
from this first principle, include such additionally commonplace 
notions as the political order is self-goveming,10 stands in contrast 
to a rule of men, It entitles everyone to due process,12 and demands 
equal justice for all." In and through an extensive set of ideas, law 
defines an American way of knowing political life and is, 
correspondingly, a focal point for citizen political identity. 
decision illustrates the national commitment to the rule of law. "Now the U.S. 
Supreme Court has spoken. Let there be no doubt, while I strongly disagree with 
the [C]ourt's decision, I accept it." See THE 43rd PRESIDENT; In His Remarks, 
Gore Says He Will Help Bush "Bring American Together," N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
14, 2000, at A26. 
7 See PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING 
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (1999) [hereinafter KAHN, CULTURAL STUDY] and Paul 
W. Kahn, Freedom, Autonomy, and the Cultural Study of Law, 13 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 141 (2001) [hereinafter Kahn, Freedom]. 
8 For an introductory discussion of cultural forms, see ERNST CASSIRER, AN 
ESSAY ON MAN: AN INTRODUCTION TO A PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN CULTURE 
(1944) [hereinafter CASSIRER, AN ESSAY ON MAN]. See also, 1-3 ERNST 
CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SYMBOLIC FORMS (Ralph Manheim trans., Yale 
Univ. Press 1953-1957) (1923-1929) [hereinafter CASSIRER, SYMBOLIC FORMS]. 
9 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
l° "Popular sovereignty theory" reflects this understanding. See, e.g., BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). A comparison of 
American constitutionalism with those of modern Western democratic orders 
helps illustrate the unique character of the American commitment to self-
government. See generally Paul W. Kahn, Comparative Constitutionalism in a 
New Key, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2677 (2003) [hereinafter Kahn, Comparative 
Constitutionalism]. 
I I One significant expression of this sentiment lies in the comments of Chief 
Justice Roberts during his confirmation hearing. Chief Justice Roberts 
specifically referenced the maxim that "we are a Government of laws and not of 
men." Confirmation Hearings on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr to Be 
Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to 
be Chief Justice of the United States). 
12 Robert Cover captured the depth of this commitment to process in 
referencing "the surreal epistemology of due process." Robert M. Cover, The 
Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 8-9 (1983). 
" A closely related phrase is "equal justice under law," which is etched on 
the façade of the United States Supreme Court. 
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As a cultural form, law has its own integrity. It is an 
autonomous realm of experience. I4 Law will always seek to 
maintain this existential character and to accomplish this end, 
which ultimately is one of indefinite self-perpetuation, law 
demands a behavioral practice from those who participate in its 
form of political experience. Specifically, it requires that they act 
in a manner that supports its universe of meaning. Necessarily, this 
obligation extends to all who take up a politics of the rule of law, 
but it particularly devolves onto law's representative figures. By 
definition, law is constitutive of their identity,15 and their work, 
therefore, must be to sustain law's symbolic form. If these 
individuals were to act otherwise,16 law would be unable to 
survive, and would die. Of course, the same circumstance holds 
true for these persons. That is, they too would not exist anymore, 
in their figurative mode, if they failed to maintain law's 
appearance in the world. 
This account of the essential character of law, its behavioral 
demands, and the consequences associated with a lack of their 
14 This conceptualization of law stands in marked contrast to the typical 
American view of law as instrumental only. See, e.g., Myers S. McDougal, 
Fuller v. the American Legal Realists: An Intervention, 50 YALE L.J. 827, 834-
35 (1941) ("Maw is instrumental only, a means to an end, and is to be 
appraised only in the light of the ends it achieves."); HENRY M. HART, JR. & 
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW 3-4 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994) (describing law in functional vocabulary of "constitutive or procedural 
understandings or arrangements" and "institutionalized procedures"); RICHARD 
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 75 (1981) (describing law as "a system 
for altering incentives"); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies 
Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 567 (1983) (describing law as an instrument 
to achieve leftist aims); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some 
Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175 
(1982) (understanding law as a means to address "the needs and values of both 
sexes"); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 72 
(1988) (understanding law as a means to achieving and sustaining a post-
patriarchal world); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of 
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, 
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 152 (1989) 
(understanding law as a means to achieve "the illusive goal of ending racism and 
patriarchy"). 
15 See Rakesh K. Anand, Legal Ethics, Jurisprudence, and the Cultural 
Study of the Lawyer, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 737, 749-52 (2008) [hereinafter Anand, 
Legal Ethics]. 
16  For one example of just such a failure to take up this behavioral task, see 
Rakesh K. Anand, Contemporary Civil Litigation and the Problem of 
Professional Meaning: A Jurisprudential Inquiry, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 75 
(1999) (explaining that contemporary civil litigators live a psychologically 
dissonant existence) [hereinafter Anand, Contemporary Civil Litigation]. 
• 
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satisfaction represents, in summary form, the intellectual platform 
for a series of rapers that I am writing on the practice of law in the 
United States. 7 At the core of my work is an emphasis on the 
above-referenced behavioral demands—or inherent normative 
character—of law, the acknowledgement of which has immediate 
implications for the two fields within which my scholarship locates 
itself: the cultural study of law18 and professional responsibility. 
With respect to the former, which is a distinct philosophical-
anthropological approach to the study of law,19 highlighting law's 
normative character modifies one of the discipline's basic 
assumptions—specifically, that the cultural study of law can have 
no normative implications.20 In adjusting the field's thinking in this 
way, my hope is to move the school of thought forward and open 
up a new intellectual horizon for those interested in the 
fundamental nature of the American legal order. On the side of the 
latter, focusing on law's intrinsic normativity, and thereby 
necessarily on the character of law as a cultural form, leads to a 
new way of thinking about professional responsibility in this 
country. Specifically, it points to an account of lawyer ethics 
rooted in the deepest political myths of the culture,21 what Plato 
termed a society's noble lie.22 Borrowing directly from the cultural 
study of law, I describe this project as the cultural study of the 
lawyer, and in advancing it thus far, my writing has focused on 
pointing the two discourses toward an appreciation for these 
foundational claims. More particularly, I have presented the basic 
theoretical grounding for this approach to the study of lawyering23  
17 For the presently published papers, see Rakesh K. Anand, The Role of the 
Lawyer in the American Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1611 (2009) 
[hereinafter Anand, The Role of the Lawyer]; Anand, Legal Ethics, supra note 
15; Rakesh K. Anand, Toward an Interpretive Theory of Legal Ethics, 58 
RUTGERS L. REV. 653 (2006) [hereinafter Anand, Toward an Interpretive 
Theory]; Anand, Contemporary Civil Litigation, supra note 16. 
18 For an introduction to the cultural study of law, see KAHN, CULTURAL 
STUDY, supra note 7, and Kahn, Freedom, supra note 7. 
19 See Kahn, Freedom, supra note 7, at 159 (describing the genealogy of the 
cultural study of law as the philosophical tradition of Kant-Hegel-Cassirer). 
J) KAHN, CULTURAL STUDY, supra note 7, at 2 ("All questions of reform—
the traditional end of legal study—are bracketed"). 
21  In doing so, it also offers a response to the powerful work of David 
Luban. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988). 
22 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 414c-415d (Allan Bloom trans., Basic Books 
1991) (1968). 
23 Anand, Legal Ethics, supra note 15. My emphasis on the normative 
character of a cultural form has implications beyond the study of lawyer ethics. 
Specifically, acknowledging the normative character of a cultural form has 
parallel implications for conduct associated with other cultural forms, and more 
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and have also directly engaged several concerns specific to 
professional responsibility, among other things. 24 
As is to be expected with any introduction to a new way of 
thinking about things, the presentation of the cultural study of the 
lawyer to the two disciplines brings certain matters to the surface, 
in both intellectual directions. Specifically, extending the cultural 
study of law into the domain of professional responsibility raises a 
variety of questions about the exact nature of the philosophical 
claims that the cultural study of the lawyer makes. At the same 
time, acknowledging the propriety of its methodology reveals a 
range of possible investigations that can deepen understanding of 
what it means to practice law in this country. This Article begins 
the process of addressing these questions and pursuing these lines 
of inquiry. In doing so, it also begins the next stage in the 
development of the cultural study of the lawyer. 
With respect to the philosophical claims that this Article 
discusses, each, not surprisingly, arises directly out of the project's 
engagement with the normative character of law. Significantly, 
each represents a principal point of uncertainty for those who have 
reflected on the arguments of the cultural study of the lawyer, at 
least as I have understood the reactions. In taking up the discussion 
of these particular positions, my goal is to refine and bring depth of 
understanding to the project. In doing so, I also hope to make the 
project's account of a lawyer's professional responsibility, which, 
as alluded to above, is dependent on the strength of the 
philosophical-anthropological approach to the study of the subject 
matter, more persuasive. The specific philosophical claims 
elaborated upon are (1) that law and morality are incommensurable 
and, correspondingly, that lawyer behavior is political, not moral, 
in character, (2) that the core tenets of law's universe preclude a 
range of behavior that is, at a minimum, not uncommon among 
today's practicing lawyers, and (3) that the cultural study of the 
lawyer is uniquely correct in its conceptualization of the self-
referential terms of law—for example, what qualifies as being 
"legal." After introducing the reader, particularly he or she who is 
not familiar with the project, to the three claims, this Article 
attends to each one individually, in a self-contained discourse. 
Concerning the specific examination of the practice of law that 
this Article undertakes, it begins with the recognition that the 
broadly for academic thinking about normative ethics generally. Id. at 771-72. 
See also infra p. 28. 
24  Where appropriate, I have provided detailed prescriptions of what counts 
as appropriate lawyer action. Anand, Legal Ethics, supra note I 5; Anand, The 
Role of the Lawyer, supra note 17. 
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normative demands of law do not exist in isolation, but rather 
subsist side-by-side with those of other cultural forms and indeed 
lie, at a basic level, in competition with them for the responsive 
behavior of individuals. Arguably, the most compelling challenge 
to law's normative demands comes from those associated with the 
moral form of experience25 and, as the previous paragraph might 
suggest, this contest has been the subject of earlier work in the 
cultural study of the lawyer.26 In this Article, I turn attention in a 
new direction, to the normative demands of a different cultural 
form—one whose presence in the life of the individual is steadily 
increasing in contemporary times. That cultural form is 
economics.27 Today, economics is assuming more and more of a 
dominant place in American life. For the normative demands of 
law, this circumstance translates into an increased confrontation 
with economic normativity, and correspondingly, into a greater 
possibility of confusing the role of a lawyer with that of an 
economic person and, ultimately, of losing the lawyer to the 
economic way of life. This Article explores the rival normative 
demands that each cultural form puts forth at the foundational 
leve1.28 In taking up this investigation, my goal is to make clear 
that being a lawyer and being an economic person are, 
fundamentally, two distinct forms of existence. 
This focus—on the opposing behavioral requirements of each 
cultural form—suggests at least two appropriate ways to 
conceptualize the latter portion of this Article. First, it is an effort 
in comparative ethics. How do the behavioral demands of one 
cultural form—which carry as much normative force as those of 
any other cultural form—differ from those of another? 
Correspondingly, how is one way of living distinguished from that 
of another? Second, it represents a response to the historical 
25 The reference to the moral form of experience should be understood as 
deontological in form, which is the form that contemporary moral life takes at its 
base. The criminal law, and particularly its thinking about punishment, is 
illustrative. See, e.g., JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 95 (5th ed. 2004) ("Desert is a necessary condition of 
punishment."). 
26 Law's "other," which Paul Kahn loosely terms "political action," also 
offers a compelling challenge to law's normative demands. For an overview of 
political action, see KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW, supra note I, at 27-34. 
27 The reference to economics and the economic form of experience should 
be understood in neo-classical terms. For a discussion of neo-classical 
economics as an economic theory, see infra note 137. On neo-classical 
economics as a cultural form, as distinguished from simply an economic theory, 
see infra pp. 29-30. 
26 This statement requires qualification. For the necessary limitation, see 
infra pp. 28-29. 
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question of whether the practice of law is correctly approached as a 
business (by which is meant a for-profit enterprise).29 Thorstein 
Veblen long ago noted that the business enterprise is the "directing 
force" that animates the modern industrial system.3° Put 
differently, the business enterprise—and/or the businessperson—is 
an actor, and indeed the representative figure, of the economic 
world.31 In arguing that, at the most basic level, the life of the 
lawyer and that of the economic person are separate modes of 
being, I am also claiming that, at their foundation, the lawyer is not 
a businessperson and the practice of law is not a business activity. 
To be clear, the discourse presented here is limited in character. 
As indicated, my concern is with the most basic of obligations 
associated with participation in each cultural form, obligations that 
are, in large part, in tension with one another. At least two 
consequences follow from this circumstance. First, this focus 
results in an emphasis on difference, as opposed to similarity. As a 
general matter, the normativities of cultural forms do not always 
conflict. The demands of one form of experience can be entirely 
consistent with those of another (a state of affairs that, at times, 
holds true even at the relatively foundational level).32 In focusing 
on the most basic of obligations of law and of economics, and their 
innate friction, I am necessarily presenting a restricted discussion. 
Additional analyses are left to other papers. Second, concentrating 
on the core normative demands of each cultural form, and their 
inherent opposition, produces a discourse that is rudimentary, and 
narrow-ranging. As between the normativities of any cultural 
forms, the relationship between that of law and that of economics 
is a complex one. It is also one about which disagreement over its 
29 Typically, the question of whether law is a business is framed in 
juxtaposition to the understanding of law as a profession. Because of the 
ambiguity of the word "profession," I decline to use the term. For an 
introduction to the law as profession versus law as business debate, see 
DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 38-46 (5th ed. 2009). For 
an additional source for reflection, see, e.g., A. Harrison Barnes, Treating Your 
Legal Career Like a Small Business, BCG ATTORNEY SEARCH, available at 
http://www.bcgsearch.com/pdf/60766.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2010). 
3°  THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 7-8 (Cosimo 
Classics 2005) (1904). It is perhaps necessary to note that Veblen did not 
subscribe to neo-classical economic theory but rather was an institutional 
economist. For further related comment, see infra note 137. 
31 On the firm as an actor in the marketplace, see Ronald H. Coase, The 
Nature of the Firm, in R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 33 
(1988). 
32 Technically, the normative demands can overlap, incorporate one another, 
or merge. For a relevant discussion, see infra pp. 18-21 and accompanying 
notes. 
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character can legitimately be expected to exist.33 In considering 
only the basic normative demands of each cultural form—the 
substantive natures of which are presumably beyond dispute—I 
necessarily leave a fair amount of detail to the side of the 
presentation. Further investigations, which naturally build from 
what I offer here, are again left to the future. 
Before proceeding with the two sets of arguments described 
above, this Article offers an overview of the cultural study of law 
and the relationship of the cultural study of the lawyer to it, the 
purpose of which is to help locate the reader in the intellectual 
landscape within which this Article operates. This overview 
consists of three steps. Initially, the overview places the cultural 
study of law in the intellectual setting out of which it arises. Next, 
the overview presents a substantive sketch of the school of thought 
and its central insight that law in America is a cultural form. 
Finally, the summary discusses the progression from the cultural 
study of law to the cultural study of the lawyer.34 After presenting 
these general ideas, this Article takes up its primary discussions in 
the order set out in this Introduction. 
I. FROM THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW TO THE 
CULTURAL STUDY OF THE LAWYER 
In America, legal inquiry typically takes the form of suggesting 
changes to current law in order to advance a social end.3  Most 
33 
 For a related discussion, see Anand, Legal Ethics, supra note 15, at 772- 
74. 
34 As indicated, the shift in perspective of the cultural study of the lawyer 
represents an expansion of the understanding of the philosophical possibilities of 
a cultural study of law—specifically, that it can have normative implications. 
This broader understanding suggests the unique character—and hopefully the 
attractiveness—of the cultural study of the lawyer: on the one hand, its inquiry is 
critical, and therefore neutral. At the same time, it is also normative. Infra pp. 
14-15. 
35 Of course, this phenomenon is consistent with the conventional American 
view of law as instrumental. Supra note 14. Additionally, this statement is 
obviously a generalization. A not insignificant amount of work in law is not of 
this character. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The 
Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 
UCLA L. REV. 479 (1989-1990) (providing an empirical analysis of products 
liability cases); Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet 
Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731 (1991-1992) (providing 
an empirical analysis of products liability cases); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE 
Lost WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN 
AMERICA, 1886-1937 (1998) (presenting an historical treatment of "legal 
classicism"). 
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scholars do not ground themselves within a particular theoretical 
orientation, at least not explicitly, and the promoted objective 
commonly reflects simply one discrete aspect of America's liberal 
values. Some scholars are more specifically rooted—for example, 
in neo-classical economics or a certain school of feminist 
thought—and in parallel with the field with which they associate, 
these individuals support a public agenda that reflects the 
respective discipline's more defined concerns. Accordingly, the 
standard legal academic encourages progress—in the life of the 
private citizen, the criminal, the family, the community, etc.—
through, for example, the law's accommodation of a certain 
individual right, public interest, or specialized duty,36 or 
alternatively, via its embrace of a social utility calculus,37 a more 
acute sensitivity to the constraints of patriarchy,38 or some other 
particularized standard of normative judgment. 
As this description suggests, legal scholars appeal to a wide 
range of concerns in their efforts at social reform. Not surprisingly, 
these thinkers disagree about the degree of importance 
appropriately attached to those concerns and, relatedly, about the 
desirability of the various proposals for social rearrangement. 
Those who seek to modify the law in a particular direction "x" 
frequently challenge those who wish to see the law move in 
support of "y," and vice-versa. Indeed, the conflicts among legal 
36 To the extent that this work is rooted in a theoretical orientation, that 
orientation is the legal process school. For an introduction to this school of 
thought—or perhaps, more accurately, this attitude toward law—see HENRY M. 
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1-9, 102-13, 158-61 (William N. Eskridge, 
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). On conceptualizing the legal process school 
as an attitude toward law, see NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERS OF AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 205-09 (1995). 
37 For the intellectual beginning of modern law and economics, see Ronald 
H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, in R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET 
AND THE LAW 157 (1988). For some introductory readings in modern law and 
economics, see, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 
2007); DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS (2005); A MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND 
ECONOMICS (3rd ed. 2003); NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POSTMODERNISM 57-79 (1997). 
38  For some introductory readings in law and feminism, see, e.g., Williams, 
supra note 14; West, supra note 14; Crenshaw, supra note 14; Angela P. Harris, 
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); 
Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 
101 CHLum. L. REV. 181 (2001). For a provocative response to some feminist 
writings of the 1980s, see Richard Posner, Conservative Feminism, 1989 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 191 (1989). 
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scholars are as commonplace, and as defined, as those among the 
liberal citizenry in America. 
Legal academics, then, operate in a world of internal discord, a 
state of disagreement, however, that has its limits. As much as 
legal scholars do argue about what the law should be, they do not 
challenge each other about a deeper dimension of their work—
namely, its underlying character. That is, they do not disagree 
about what they are supposed to be doing. Rather, the opposite 
state of affairs holds true. At this more fundamental level, legal 
scholars function from a broadly shared understanding of what it 
means to take up legal analysis. For all of these individuals, the job 
of the legal scholar is as indicated: to address social problems and 
push the social order forward. Put differently, for the legal 
academic, to study law is to do law.39 
The cultural study of law is a school of legal thought that reacts 
to this engaged orientation of the legal scholar.4° It begins with the 
traditional academic principle that to study something is to 
construct a critical distance from it and, from this position, to then 
take that something as an object of free inquiry.41 As is well-
known, on this understanding of the nature of the academic 
enterprise, the normative commitments of the scholar are placed, 
as much as possible, to the side of the investigation, with the 
intention that they not impact the relevant analysis. Inquiry is to be 
detached, taken up without the interests of the interlocutor in mind. 
The purpose of this condition on inquiry is straightforward. Under 
the constraint of self-separation, the scholar is able to pursue the 
identified aim of study, which is the acquisition of knowledge in 
whatever direction it lies. 
Quite naturally, this shift in approach to legal study leads to a 
variety of fresh questions for the scholar to pursue and, 
correspondingly, to an assortment of new understandings about 
law, knowledge that usefully supplements the legal academy's 
conventional discourse.42 While the range of learning is broad, and 
continues to expand, running throughout the school of thought's 
investigation is a foundational insight about the nature of law in 
39 KAHN, CULTURAL STUDY, supra note 7, at 27 ("Legal scholars are not 
studying law, they are doing it."). 
40 Id. at 137. 
41 Id. at 31-34. 
42 Paul Kahn is the founder of this school of legal thought. For a sample of 
his work, see KAHN, CULTURAL STUDY, supra note 7; PAUL W. KAHN, LAW 
AND LOVE: THE TRIALS OF KING LEAR (2000); PAUL W. KAHN, PUTTING 
LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE (2005) [hereinafter KAHN, LIBERALISM]; PAUL W. 
KAHN, OUT OF EDEN: ADAM AND EVE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 198 (2007). 
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the United States: it is a cultural form—a type of cultural activity 
that generates a complete world of meaning.43 In this respect, law 
is no different than the social practice of religion, science, or art. In 
each sphere of experience, the participant internalizes a way of 
making sense of the world and in and through the embraced mode 
of living comes to a kind of objective understanding of the reality 
that surrounds him or her.44 
As is to be expected with this type of socially imaginative 
endeavor, its basic outline consists of a number of familiar ideas. 
They begin with the American belief in popular sovereignty, 
which, to be clear, is just that—a belief. We the People is a type of 
God in America's secular political order and is comprehensible 
only as an object of popular faith.45 There is no identifiable actor in 
the world "We the People." We cannot point to this entity as a 
subject in physical time and space. We the People exists in a 
universe outside the temporal domain, and in a realm beyond us.46 
The remaining character of law's universe builds from this 
mythical point of political origin,47 and if we ask what the other 
elementary beliefs involved in the cultural practice of law are, the 
examples include those already noted in the Introduction,48 as well 
as such everyday notions as the rule of law is permanent until 
changed49 and will resolve disputes through the force of the state, 
if necessary.5° Taken together, these ideas, in conjunction with a 
myriad of additional concepts and other kinds of symbols, afford 
the entry point to political life in America, and in and through 
them, the American apprehends that aspect of his or her being. 
43 The fact that law is a cultural form does not diminish the reality of its 
functional character. Approaching law strictly in functional terms, however, fails 
to capture the truth of law in the United States, and thus represents a failure in 
observation. For a discussion of this point, see Anand, Legal Ethics, supra note 
15, at 766. 
44 CASSIRER, AN ESSAY ON MAN, supra note 8, at 143 (describing art as one 
path to "an objective view of things and of human life"). 
45 For an introduction to political theology, see CARL SCHMitT, POLITICAL 
THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (George 
Schwab trans., MIT Press 1985) (1922). 
46 KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAw, supra note 1, at 27 ("Individuals exist; 
communities may exist. But 'the people' occupy a time and space of sovereignty 
that is not a place into which any individual can enter."). 
47 In jurisprudential terms, "We the People" can be understood along the 
lines of Kelsen's basic norm. See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max 
Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1967) (1934). 
48 Supra p. 2. 
49 KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAw, supra note 1, at 19-21. 
For a discussion of law's violence, see Cover, supra note 12. 
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Importantly, if we explore the depth of that apprehension, we 
see the true richness of the American cultural practice of law. At 
this more profound level, law constructs the American experience 
of community, and therefore of history.51 What it means to be an 
American is inextricably linked to the cultural practice of law.52 
The bedrock ideas of American identity—for example, freedom53  
and self-government—are bound up in, and realized through, this 
form of political experience.54 Unsurprisingly, along this path of 
the experiential we also find the locus of American nationalism, 
which can only be civic, and not ethnic.55  
The insight that law is a cultural form lies at the core of the 
cultural study of law. The basic discussion of the insight is not 
complete, however, with only a statement of its fact and an 
accompanying sketch of its cosmology and its associated 
phenomenology. In addition, the discourse requires articulation of 
certain philosophical understandings, understandings that the 
observation of law as a cultural form itself reflects. That is, to see 
that law is a cultural form is at once to affirm some specifically 
philosophical teachings. More precisely, it is to affirm a theory of 
knowledge and an associated theory of meaning—one that is Neo-
Kantian in nature. 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explained that what we 
know and how we know it are products of the conceptual apparatus 
that we bring to bear on experience. It is in and through a 
conceptual framework that we construct an order of things. We 
have no access to an unmediated reality. We never know 
something purely or "in itself." Rather, all objects of experience 
are understood in and through the interceding activity of our 
5 KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW, supra note I. 
52 See, e.g., KAHN, CULTURAL STUDY, supra note 7, at 9 (discussing the 
generally immigrant character of the American citizen and the dependency of 
his or her identity on law). 
53 Those who would locate American identity strictly in the concept 
"freedom" fail to recognize that concept's inextricable link with law. For an 
example of such an error, see Richard A. Posner, Cultural Studies and the Law, 
53 RARITAN, Fall 1999 (reviewing PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF 
LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (1999)). 
54 In his well-known work on nationalism, Benedict Anderson makes a 
somewhat similar point in his generalized discussion of the relationship between 
freedom and sovereignty. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 7 (rev. ed. 1991). 
55 Not surprisingly, the central role of civic life in America has its roots at 
least as far back as the founding of the country, the core meaning of which was 
the creation of a republican community. See GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF 
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 46-90 (1969). 
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minds.56 Put slightly differently, and in the vocabulary of more 
contemporary times, knowledge is largely constructed in character, 
and what we know exists, in significant part, only within ourselves. 
Kant was an intellectual figure of the modern age and, consistent 
with the thinking of his time, the world appeared a single way to 
him. Correspondingly, he universalized a reality that was an 
historically and experientially contingent one. Today, in the post-
modern era, we recognize this limitation in thought and, in turn, 
acknowledge the variety of conceptual structures, both within and 
across time and dimensions of experience, that operate within the 
human imagination, and in and through which man makes sense of 
the external world.57 Religious belief systems,58 scientific 
theories,59 and artistic images60—as well as the collective symbols 
of law—represent just these structures in and through which we 
organize and comprehend experience. In its apprehension of law as 
a cultural form, the cultural study of law necessarily embraces this 
contemporary form of Kant's insight. 
Furthermore, it does so explicitly. The cultural study of law 
consciously locates itself within the Neo-Kantian tradition of 
epistemology.61 And, this circumstance underscores a basic 
characteristic of the school of thought that should be made clear. 
Fundamentally, the cultural study of law is a philosophical inquiry. 
Its home is in the discipline of philosophy (and not, for example, in 
56 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (F. Max Muller trans., 
Anchor Books 1966) (1781). For an introductory discussion of this topic, see 
JUSTUS HARTNACK, KANT'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE (M. Holmes Hartshorne 
trans., Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1967) (1965). For an excellent discussion 
of Kantian epistemology, one that also places his epistemological thinking in 
context with his other work, see ERNST CASSIRER, KANT'S LIFE AND THOUGHT 
(James Haden trans., Yale Univ. Press 1981) (1918). 
57 CASSIRER, SYMBOLIC FORMS, supra note 8. 
58  On religious belief systems as structures of the imagination, see 
generally PETER BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A 
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF RELIGION (1967). 
59  For a treatment of the intellectual history of physics, see generally 
ALBERT EINSTEIN & LEOPOLD INFELD, THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICS (1938). 
Today, string theory (perhaps more specifically M-theory) offers a new 
alternative to both relativity theory and standard quantum theory. For an 
introduction to string theory, see generally BRIAN GREENE, THE ELEGANT 
UNIVERSE: SUPERSTRINGS, HIDDEN DIMENSIONS, AND THE QUEST FOR THE 
ULTIMATE THEORY (1999). 
6° For a discussion of art as a cultural form, see CASSIRER, AN ESSAY ON 
MAN, supra note 8, at 137-70. 
61 Kahn, Freedom, supra note 7, at 159 (describing the genealogy of the 
cultural study of law as the philosophical tradition of Kant-Hegel-Cassirer). 
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anthropology or in one of the more conventionally understood 
forms of "cultural studies").62 
This axis of intellectual orientation defines the broad character 
of the cultural study of law's work. Correspondingly, it also directs 
the cultural study of law's scholarly task, which, in light of the 
school of thought's commitment to Neo-Kantianism, is directed at 
the imaginative structure of the American mind, and is, technically, 
a two-fold inquiry.63 First, the project of the cultural study of law is 
to clarify the epistemic structure of the American legal experience. 
What is the set of beliefs around which the American cultural 
practice of law is organized? Second, the undertaking of the 
cultural study of law is to describe the experience of meaning 
associated with the internalization of these ideas.64 What is the 
phenomenology that attaches to the American beliefs about law? 
Ultimately, in taking up this task, the cultural study of law makes a 
valuable contribution to the Academy, and to society, by providing 
an account of the American as a political citizen, among other 
things. In doing so, it also offers the American—or, more 
precisely, the individual who identifies him- or herself as an 
American—an understanding of who he or she is.65  
The cultural study of the lawyer is born out of the cultural 
study of law. It is an approach to law and lawyer ethics that accepts 
the cultural study of law's basic organizing principles. It shares the 
understanding of what it means to study law, agrees that law is a 
cultural form, correspondingly locates itself within the Neo- 
Kantian tradition of epistemology, understands itself to be 
philosophical in character, and sees its task—and academic and 
social contribution—in terms somewhat similar to that of the 
cultural study of law (as explained below). As an offspring of the 
field, the cultural study of the lawyer locates itself within the 
cultural study of law and understands the school of thought to be 
its intellectual home. 
At the same time as the cultural study of the lawyer is ground 
in the discipline, it does not, however, entirely embrace the 
intellectual psychology of the field. In one respect, the cultural 
62 N. (describing the cultural study of law as rooted in philosophy). 
63 KAHN, CULTURAL STUDY, supra note 7, at 141, n.2 (describing the 
cultural study of law as a hermeneutic inquiry that is both phenomenological and 
transcendental). 
64 On "thick description" of experiences of meaning, see CLIFFORD GEERTZ, 
Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE 
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3 (1973). 
65 As Paul Kahn has explained, American political experience is contested. 
For a reference to law's "other," see supra note 26. 
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study of the lawyer operates outside the boundaries of the field's 
established thinking and this point of intellectual difference gives 
rise to a certain lack of harmony between the cultural study of the 
lawyer and the cultural study of law. In this dimension, the two 
sides exist in a tension, and they do so because in its turn away 
from the cultural study of law, the cultural study of the lawyer 
moves against one the school of thought's founding ideas. 
Specifically, it challenges one of the school of thought's premises 
about its own scholarly possibilities. That premise concerns the 
normative consequences of critical inquiry. 
In line with traditional philosophical understandings about this 
form of investigation, the cultural study of law maintains that 
critical inquiry can have no normative implications of its own.66 In 
making this argument, the cultural study of law stays within the 
bounds within which this claim is typically asserted—namely, as a 
commentary on the relationship of the scholar, and his or her 
preferences, to the scholarly project—and within these limits, the 
assertion is of course correct. The self-separation of the scholar 
from his or her object of study denies the possibility of investing 
one's own opinions in any scholarly analysis. With critical inquiry, 
one's own normative inclinations always lie outside the bounds of 
investigation.67 While the cultural study of the lawyer readily 
acknowledges this fact, it ultimately sees this account of the 
normative implications of critical inquiry as incomplete. The 
reasoning is straightforward (although perhaps foreign to 
conventional sensibilities). The fact that critical inquiry precludes 
normative discourse in a self-grounded form does not exclude the 
possibility of normative analysis altogether. The normative 
implications of this type of study simply extend in a different 
direction than that of conventional philosophical focus. In 
particular, the cultural study of the lawyer recognizes that the 
object of inquiry itself may possess a normative character, and 
therefore critical inquiry can, at least at times, speak to normative 
issues. In the context of a cultural study—of whatever type of 
cultural form—just such a circumstance is present.68  
A cultural form is an autonomous realm of experience. It is a 
world in itself and, correspondingly, is an end in itself. 
Importantly, a cultural form is not indifferent to its existence and 
to sustain itself as a universe of meaning, it makes demands that 
66 See, e.g, KAHN, CULTURAL STUDY, supra note 7, at 2 ("All questions of 
reform . are bracketed."). 
67 There is an obvious limitation to this statement, as we can never fully 
remove ourselves from the structures of our own experience. 
68 See generally Anand, Legal Ethics, supra note 15. 
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those who take up its form of meaning engage in a particular 
behavioral practice—one that supports the cultural form's 
constituent character. Without this insistence on behavioral 
harmony, a cultural form dies, because it exists in and through the 
individuals who take up its practice and, therefore, exists only as 
long as individuals in fact do so.69 
Perhaps our most familiar examples of these behavioral 
demands lie in the psychological dynamics of religious and 
linguistic practice. Both religion and language insist that those who 
relate to the world in and through their respective mediums act in a 
manner consistent with the structural elements of each (e.g., the 
beliefs and rituals of religion, or the vocabulary and syntax of 
language). These claims on conduct manifest themselves as a 
psychological pressure placed on the individual to act in 
conformity with a cultural form's way of being. Although this 
pressure is perhaps not always evident (specifically, if we focus on 
the circumstance where the individual is acting in accordance with 
the prescribed course of conduct), it is apparent when we look to 
those situations where an individual deviates, or attempts to 
deviate, from the religious or linguistic path. If an individual acts 
against his or her religious convictions or speaks his or her 
language incorrectly, he or she experiences a psychological tension 
in him- or herself, along with a "felt necessity" to act in the 
appropriate religious or linguistic fashion.7°  
Similar psychological dynamics reside in other cultural forms, 
and in their ubiquity, these psychological dynamics help illustrate 
the demand for behavioral conformity that characterizes a cultural 
form. Because this insistence is a prescription to the individual of 
how he or she is to act, and because such prescribing is precisely 
what it means to be normative, a conclusion about the normative 
character of a cultural form is inescapable: a cultural form is 
inherently normative. 
We can capture this understanding of the normative character 
of a cultural form in explicitly philosophical terms, and in light of 
the philosophical foundation of a cultural study, such an account is 
appropriate and necessary for a full appreciation of this idea. To 
return to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason, we see that in his 
explanation of the constructed character of knowledge, Kant spoke 
of the "a priori" when referring to the conceptual apparatus that we 
69 History teaches us this lesson. As civilizations have died out, so too have 
their cultural practices. 
7° One can compare the statements made in this paragraph with that of Peter 
Berger, who notes that lilt is impossible to use language without participating 
in its order." BERGER, supra note 58, at 20. 
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bring to bear on experience—because it exists prior to, or is a 
necessary condition of, our understanding of things.7I Consistent 
with today's post-modern thinking, the cultural study of law 
adjusts this vocabulary and conceives of the structures of our 
experience in the Foucauldian language of the "historical a 
priori."72 With the recognition that the historical a priori has an 
inherent normativity, we can build upon the terminology of the 
cultural study of law and refer to the "normative character of the 
historical a priori." In Neo-Kantian terms, the cultural study of the 
lawyer points to this phenomenon, and it is the consideration of 
this phenomenon that sets the cultural study of the lawyer apart—
that defines its intellectual distance—from the cultural study of 
law. It is the same consideration that also points the cultural study 
of the lawyer to its scholarly agenda. 
For the cultural study of the lawyer, the specific cultural form 
of interest is, of course, law, and within this intellectual setting—
and following on from its appreciation of the normative character 
of the historical a priori—the project centers its attention on law's 
inherent normativity. Just as religion and language make 
psychological demands on those who take up their form of 
experience, so too does the cultural form of law. Law insists on a 
kind of "legal patriotism" from those who participate in its form of 
politics.73 These individuals must devote themselves to its tenets, a 
dedication that is to manifest itself in action. If these demands fail 
to be adhered to, law does not survive as a universe of meaning.74 
To offer just one example of this phenomenon, law presents the 
political order as rule-governed and commands those who embrace 
its world to live by those rules. The individual who takes law 
seriously experiences the pull of these demands and the need to act 
accordingly. The phenomenology of judging offers a readily 
accessible illustration of this point. As judges tell us, they feel the 
demand to decide cases according to rules of law and to refrain 
from appealing to their own preferences in the course of 
71 See generally KANT, supra note 56. 
72 See, e.g., KAHN, CULTURAL STUDY, supra note 7, at 91. Accordingly, in 
technical terms, it is the historical a priori that is the object of a cultural study's 
critical inquiry. The scholarly task is to clarify its structures and describe the 
phenomenological experience associated with it. 
73 I owe this term to Paul Kahn. 
74 In this vein, one can consider the emphasis that former Supreme Court 
Justice David Souter has placed on the need for greater civic education. Tony 
Mauro, Souter: Republic is Lost Unless Civic Education Improves, BLOG OF 
LEGAL 	 TIMES, 	 May 	 20, 	 2009, 	 available 	 at 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/bIt/2009/05/souter-republic-is-lost-unless-civic-
education-improves-.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2010). 
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adjudication.75 A similar instance lies in the citizenry's experience 
of a judicial decision. When a ruling is announced, the citizens 
accept it, their taste for the substantive outcome notwithstanding.76 
The cultural study of the lawyer focuses on this normative 
reality, and against this backdrop—with the fact of law's 
normativity as its point of intellectual orientation—the cultural 
study of the lawyer moves forward and takes up its inquiry. This 
inquiry pushes in two intellectual directions. First, progressing 
along the line of the cultural study of law, the cultural study of the 
lawyer examines the nature of law's normativity and the 
philosophical consequences associated with that normativity. What 
is law trying to be, and what implications does the answer have for 
our thinking about related matters (for example, the relationship of 
law to morality,77 the approriate character of discourse,78 or the 
existential state of lawyers? )? Second, turning at a slight angle 
away from the cultural study of law, the cultural study of the 
lawyer builds from the discipline's work and investigates the 
implications of law's normativity for the behavior and conceptual 
identity of its most representative figures.8° Given the 
understanding of law's world that the cultural study of law 
75 See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: 
Some Reflections on Current Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385 (1983-84) (observing that federal appellate judges do not 
feel permitted or required to exercise discretion in most cases). Relatedly, 
citizen outcry is commonplace when a judge is perceived to have failed to 
adhere to the rule of law. Such outcry is captured, in part, in the phrase "activist 
judge," which is understood to be a derogatory term. For an example of the non-
complimentary use of this phrase, see Hatch: Obama Using 'Code' for Activist 
Judge, GEORGE'S BOTTOM LINE, May 3, 2009, available at 
http://blogs.abcnews.com/george/2009/05/hatch-obama-usi.html.  
76 The most pronounced example of this phenomenon lies in the American 
reaction to Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). See also TIIE 43rd PRESIDENT; 
In His Remarks, Gore Says He Will help Bush "Bring American Together," 
supra note 6. For an additional comment, see Anand, Toward an Interpretive 
Theory, supra note 17, at 681. See also JOSEPH G. ALLEGRETTI, THE LAWYER'S 
CALLING: CHRISTIAN FAITH AND LEGAL PRACTICE 71 (1996) ("It is a quite 
extraordinary fact about our legal system . . . that unsuccessful litigants almost 
always accept a verdict even when they complain that it was wrong or unfair."). 
Not unimportantly, psychological research has documented that Americans view 
the legitimacy of a legal outcome, at least in part, as a function of procedural 
fairness (with fairness including, in part, the opportunity to be heard). For an 
introduction to "procedural justice," see TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE 
LAW (1990). 
77 Anand, Legal Ethics, supra note 15, at 764-69. 
78 Infra Part IIC. 
79 See generally Anand, Contemporary Civil Litigation, supra note 16. 
Technically, the conclusions of the cultural study of the lawyer extend, at 
least in part, to the citizen. 
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provides, what obligations devolve onto the lawyer from his or her 
commitment to that world? Put differently, how is a lawyer? (For 
example, law presents itself as "not the rule of men." What follows 
from this condition with respect to the practicing lawyer's 
conduct?)81 Relatedly, what does a commitment to law's world tell 
us about what it means to be a lawyer, in the first instance? 
To be absolutely clear about the nature of this scholarly 
inquiry, and thereby of the cultural study of the lawyer, two 
comments should be made. On the one hand, it should be clear that 
this inquiry is a critical inquiry. It is a "detached" form of 
investigation. As indicated, the intellectual difference between the 
cultural study of the lawyer and the cultural study of law concerns 
the scholarly possibilities of their type of philosophical study, not 
what it means to study something. Accordingly, the analysis that 
the cultural study of the lawyer takes up maintains the disengaged 
attitude that is characteristic of the cultural study of law. On the 
other hand, both the discussion of the cultural study of the lawyer's 
position on the scholarly possibilities of a cultural study and the 
description of its scholarly agenda make plain that this inquiry is 
explicitly normative—specifically, along its second path of 
investigation. In this intellectual direction, which is the domain of 
legal ethics, the analysis is prescriptive.82 
From the perspective of the cultural study of the lawyer, the 
fact that the investigation is critical speaks to the power of the 
normative analysis. It is a neutral one—or at least as neutral a one 
as possible.83 The arguments that the cultural study of the lawyer 
presents concerning a lawyer's professional responsibility, as well 
st See generally Anand, The Role of the Lawyer, supra note 17. 
82 As the above discussion makes clear, philosophical inquiry is 
appropriately normative when taking up questions of lawyer ethics (as well as 
when considering issues of applied ethics more generally), at least in some 
circumstances. This understanding challenges Daniel Markovits' recent claim 
that the contributions of philosophical inquiry to questions of ethical life are 
"primarily interpretive and reconstructive rather than directly regulative." 
DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A 
DEMOCRATIC AGE 19 (2008) (emphasis omitted). Importantly, the behavioral 
prescriptions that follow from a cultural study of the lawyer cannot fairly be said 
to concern "stylized" or "sensational" cases. For examples of the cultural study 
of the lawyer's behavioral prescriptions, see Anand, Legal Ethics supra note 15, 
at 780-82 and Anand, The Role of the Lawyer, supra note 17, at 1628-32. For 
Markovits' reference to "stylized" or "sensational" cases, see MARKOVITS, 
supra note, at 17-21. 
83 This neutral character of the project's normative analysis points to the 
distinction between "understanding" and "experience." For a short comment on 
this distinction, see Anand, Contemporary Civil Litigation, supra note 16, at 
107, n. 168 and KAHN, CULTURAL STUDY, supra note 7, at 35. 
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as his or her identity, find their ground outside the individual 
preferences of the interlocutor and inside the claims of American 
culture. Of course, this circumstance contrasts sharply with the 
normative character of conventional legal scholarship, whose 
various "approaches" reflect, in significant part, the disposition of 
the scholar. For those who share the belief that what it means to 
study something is to construct a critical distance from it, the 
cultural study of the lawyer should represent a more convincing 
form of normative scholarship.84 
II. REFINING THE CULTURAL STUDY OF THE LAWYER: 
DEVELOPING THREE PHILOSOPHICAL CLAIMS 
Part I described the scholarly agenda of the cultural study of 
the lawyer, at the center of which lies the recognition of the 
inherent normative character of law. Half of that agenda involves 
the push of the cultural study of law into the field of professional 
responsibility, and along this intellectual axis, the acknowledgment 
and consequent consideration of law's normativity necessarily 
brings certain subject matters to the forefront of discourse. This 
Part considers three philosophical claims that lie in this intellectual 
terrain, claims that the cultural study of the lawyer has made in 
earlier work, but that require additional treatment for the reasons 
discussed below. More precisely, in this Introduction to Part II, I 
explain the context within which certain questions arise and what 
these questions presented are. I also provide a summary 
explanation of the answers to come. Subparts A, B, and C then 
take up the questions presented in detail. 
The first philosophical claim that this Part addresses concerns 
the relationship between the cultural form of law and the cultural 
form of morality, and the consequences of this relationship for the 
conceptualization of lawyer behavior. Both legal and moral life 
speak directly to the question of how one should act in his or her 
relationship with others. In focusing on the normative character of 
law, the cultural study of the lawyer has been, almost immediately, 
forced to reflect on these overlapping demands, and, in taking up 
the analysis, the project has turned to an examination of first 
principles—that is, to an investigation of the nature of law and 
84 On the promise of the cultural study of the lawyer, see Anand, Legal 
Ethics, supra note 15, at 773-74. In addition to whatever practical benefits 
normative scholarship, as a general matter, might have, this form of normative 
scholarship offers benefits in the direction of self-understanding. See, e.g., 
Anand, Contemporary Civil Litigation, supra note 16. 
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morality. This inquiry has led the study to acknowledge the 
integrity of each form of existence, and, with this understanding in 
hand, the cultural study of the lawyer has arrived at a basic 
conclusion: the two domains of experience are incommensurable, 
and, correspondingly, lawyer behavior is political, not moral, 
behavior."  
These two points are central to the project. And, while the 
work in the cultural study of the lawyer has described the basic 
character of these ideas, it has not, thus far, articulated some of 
their more detailed aspects. Consequently, some important 
questions about the arguments remain unanswered, particularly 
with respect to how far these understandings extend themselves. 
Yes, law and morality are incommensurable. But to what extent 
does this irreducibility mean that they talk past, and operate 
outside of, each other? Likewise, how political—and how not 
moral—is lawyer conduct? Subpart A responds to both questions, 
explaining that (1) the distinction between the two cultural forms is 
complex, and one must be cautious in drawing out their differential 
character, and (2) in a similar vein, the political character of lawyer 
behavior is qualified in form. 
Turning away from law's relationship to another cultural form 
and focusing inward on law itself, the second philosophical claim 
that this Part addresses concerns the self-presentation of the 
cultural form of law and its consequences for thinking about 
lawyering in America. As earlier described, the scholarly agenda 
of the cultural study of the lawyer is, in part, to take up the 
teachings of the cultural study of law and, in light of the fact of 
law's normativity, explore their implications for the lawyer's 
professional responsibility and identity. Thus far, in employing this 
approach to the analysis of lawyer ethics, the cultural study of the 
lawyer has appealed to certain core tenets of law and made a 
variety of corresponding claims about the practice of law and the 
concept of the lawyer. For example, the project has argued that, 
because the rule of law is an expression of popular sovereignty, the 
lawyer's primary obligation is to the People as opposed to the 
"client" traditionally conceived.86 Relatedly, because the rule of 
law is not the rule of men, lawyers must respect the substantive 
character of rules of law and refrain from "muddy[ing] the 
" Anand, Legal Ethics, supra note 15, at 737-72. For purposes of precision 
and depth of understanding, it should be noted that the incommensurability of 
law and morality means that a normative equality exists between the two 
domains of experience, as well as between their associated behaviors. For a 
discussion of this point, see infra p. 28. 
Anand, Legal Ethics, supra note 15, at 776-78. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol3/iss1/5
2010] ADVANCING THE CULTURAL STUDY OF THE LAWYER 
	 129 
headwaters"87 of law practice (for example, by filing pleadings that 
have no chance of success on the merits or cross-examining the 
truth-telling witness).88 As these examples begin to illustrate, many 
of the project's assertions challenge conventional sensibilities, and 
although the project has been conscious of this state of affairs, in at 
least one dimension it has not fully accounted for the propriety of 
its positions. Specifically, the cultural study of the lawyer has not 
entirely explained why the core tenets lead to a displacement of a 
number of forms of familiar, or at least not unfamiliar, behavior. 
Why exactly do the core elements of law's world effect a rejection 
of this type of conduct? Stated differently, and in the alternative, 
undoubtedly the core elements of law's world have something to 
say about lawyer ethics, perhaps even a great deal in certain 
discrete circumstances, but what justifies the absolute status that 
the cultural study of the lawyer accords them? Why can't 
lawyering take the form of a variety of differing activities—and, 
more precisely, a variety of differing activities in the manner that 
Wittgenstein describes the assorted uses of linguistic forms (i.e., as 
a family of social practices having no ultimate common ground 
and thus having no real coherence)?89 
Both of these sets of questions arise internal to law's world. 
When we take them up, we engage the discourse on the terms of 
law. With considerations of Wittgenstein in mind, however, we can 
pause and, reflecting on this boundary of discourse, additionally 
challenge the project at its point of origin. The cultural study of the 
lawyer begins with the assertion that law is a cultural form built 
around We the People. But is a world of law rooted in We the 
People the only cultural form of law available to Americans? If 
not, doesn't a philosophical-anthropological approach to "law" 
lead to a variety of cultural studies of law and, correspondingly, to 
multiple accounts of lawyer ethics in the first instance, including 
87 This phrase comes from Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional 
Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161 (1958). 
xx Anand, Legal Ethics, supra note 15, at 780-82. Other examples include 
engaging in discovery abuse, counseling his or her client to take advantage of 
lax administrative agency enforcement practices arising out of budgetary 
constraints to evade legal requirements, and counseling his or her client to 
characterize tax filings so as to avoid negative financial consequences when no 
serious foundation for the representations exist. 
89 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 1-242 
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1958). For an introduction to this text, see 
DAVID G. STERN, WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS: AN 
INTRODUCTION (2004); see also JOACHIM SCHULTE, WITTGENSTEIN: AN 
INTRODUCTION (William H. Brenner & John F. Holley trans., SUNY Press 
1992). 
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the one pursued by the project, but also perhaps one that defends 
the lawyering practices known to us? 
Subpart B flushes out the reasoning that supports the cultural 
study of the lawyer's analysis of lawyer professional responsibility 
and identity, and directly responds to each of the three categories 
of questions. At the center of the discussion is the concept of 
political authority—more specifically, law's perspective on the 
character of authority within the political order, and the extent to 
which legal authority under law's rule is the form of legal power to 
which the American responds—and relatedly, the concept of 
political meaning. Because political authority is at the root of 
political meaning, the character of the former shapes that of the 
latter. Equally, because political meaning attaches to political 
authority, we can identify legal experience—"register" legal 
phenomenologies—by observing which legal powers one follows. 
As Subpart B explains, in law's world, authority in the political 
order is unified and therefore, so is political meaning. Furthermore, 
law's world appears to be the sole legal form to which the 
American attaches him- or herself Given this state of affairs, as 
Subpart B also explains, an account of appropriate lawyer behavior 
necessarily privileges the elementary characteristics of the cultural 
form of law, and such an account of lawyer ethics is the sole 
possible one for the cultural student of law. 
Maintaining an inward focus on law, but broadening the 
relevant intellectual horizon, the third philosophical claim that this 
Part addresses concerns the implications for discourse that arise 
out of law's existential character—that is, out of the fact that law is 
a cultural form. More specifically, the third philosophical claim 
involves a linguistic position that the cultural study of the lawyer 
has taken in its investigation of lawyer ethics and identity. In 
building from Paul Kahn's insight that law is a cultural form and 
from the project's recognition that the cultural form has a 
normative character, the cultural study of the lawyer has made 
explicit assertions about the proper application of "law," "legal," 
and related terms. For example, the project has argued that its 
understanding of what practicing "law" looks like as well as its 
conceptualization of the field of "legal" ethics are, at one level, 
objectively correct. In turn, the project has criticized alternate 
orientations toward these issues—which claim the vocabulary but 
do not conform to the project's standard for the use of the terms—
as misconceived. For example, the project has stated that 
contemporary civil litigators present themselves as practicing 
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"law," but are not in fact doing so." Similarly, conventional 
theorists of professional responsibility profess to be offering an 
account of "legal ethics," but are actually doing something else 
(which is not to say that their work is without value).91 How does 
the project defend this argument—that it has a better claim to the 
definition of "legal" vocabulary? 
Subpart C presents the relevant explanation, which, building 
from the fact of the existence and self-integrity of a cultural form, 
emphasizes the discursive limitations that are a necessary 
consequence of that condition. A cultural form always asserts an 
entitlement to the use of the relevant referential language, a 
statement of a sort of "linguistic jurisdiction" over the terminology. 
As subpart C describes, out of the fact of the existence and self-
integrity of a cultural form comes a requirement for discourse to 
respect those linguistic claims and to operate within their 
boundaries. Vis-à-vis the cultural form of law, this circumstance 
means that law's conceptualization of the referential language of 
concern establishes the correct use of the terms and provides a 
standard against which to measure and critique the employment of 
"legal" language. And, the upshot of this state of affairs is that the 
project is justified in its argument of linguistic privilege, and, 
correspondingly, in its criticism of those who embrace an alternate 
meaning of the vocabulary of law. 
A. The Incommensurability of Law and Morality, and the 
Political Character of Lawyering 
As indicated earlier, a cultural form is an autonomous realm of 
experience. It possesses its own self-integrity. One consequence of 
this condition is that cultural forms are not commensurable with 
one another—that is, they cannot be compared. For example, we 
cannot measure religious understanding against scientific fact or 
artistic practice against moral truth, or vice-versa. The terms of 
discourse of one are simply not reducible to those of the other.92 
As foreign a thought as it may be to the conventional sensibilities 
of liberal society,93 this state of affairs characterizes the 
91) Anand, Contemporary Civil Litigation, supra note 16. 
91  Anand, Legal Ethics, supra note 15. 
92 Id. at 761-62. 
93 For a treatment of the appropriate conceptualization of liberalism, see 
KAHN, LIBFRALISM, supra note 42. See also Anand, Legal Ethics, supra note 15, 
at 753-63 
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relationship between politics and morality."  Like the experience 
associated with other cultural forms, political experience and moral 
experience are also not comparable. Political action—for example, 
the killing of an innocent individual in war—is not comprehensible 
in the conceptual vocabulary of moral life, nor is moral 
imperative—for example, the prohibition on killing innocent 
individuals—intelligible in the language of political existence. 
Each arena operates according to its own categories of 
understanding95 and its own standards for evaluating behavior.96 
For the cultural study of the lawyer, the incommensurability of 
politics and morality collapses to the incommensurability of law 
and morality. And, as stated above, for purposes of this Subpart, 
the question of concern is what the relationship between these two 
spheres of experience specifically looks like. Legal and moral life 
may be incomparable,97 but how exactly are we to understand this 
state of affairs? Is the claim that law and morality function wholly 
independently of one another? If so, how do we make sense of 
facts that seemingly suggest just the opposite circumstance? If not, 
what is the nature of the dynamic that exists between these two 
domains? To answer these questions requires a two-step 
discussion, one that preliminarily addresses the baseline character 
of the relationship between the two cultural forms, and then 
subsequently takes up a more complex issue: the quality of the 
border that delimits the two dimensions of experience. 
Initially, it should be made clear that law and morality do not 
function wholly independently of one another. Put differently, 
incommensurability does not equal insularity (a point that the early 
writing in the cultural study of the lawyer has explicitly made).98  
Cultural forms are irreconcilable on each other's terms, but this 
condition does not mean that the different spheres of experience 
94  For a statement of the understanding of moral life that informs this 
Article, see supra note 25. 
95  The fundamental categories of understanding are "citizen-alien" in 
politics and "individual personhood" in moral life. The distinction between 
citizen and alien is reflected, for example, in immigration law. See, e.g., 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006) (defining "alien" as noncitizen or nonnational of 
United States). On the dominant place of deontological ethics in contemporary 
moral life, see supra note 25. 
96 See, e.g., KAHN, CULTURAL STUDY, supra note 7, at 38; Kahn, Freedom, 
supra note 7, at 158 and Anand, Legal Ethics, supra note 15, at 767-68. 
97  A simple illustration lies with law's violence, which cannot be 
conceptualized in the terms of moral discourse and which cannot always be 
reconciled with demands of moral belief. For an introductory discussion of law's 
violence, see Cover, supra note 12. 
98 See, e.g., Anand, Legal Ethics, supra note 15, at 769-70. 
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are necessarily isolated from one another. Rather, just the opposite 
can be true. One cultural form can influence another, and this 
circumstance is characteristic of the relationship between legal and 
moral life. More precisely, and as our commonplace observations 
and experiences tell us, the former is regularly affected by the 
latter. The making and application of law is illustrative. Although 
laws are composed and enforced according to their dictates, even 
when unjust, they are also commonly written with moral beliefs in 
mind." 
Past this first point of emphasis—that law and morality do 
intersect—a more subtle topic for explanation concerns the manner 
and degree of their intersection. Law often defines and applies 
itself in light of moral commitments. But it does so in more than 
one way, and this varied manner of interfacing with morality has 
consequences for the relationship between the two spheres of 
experience. Specifically, at times, it affects the clarity of the line 
that might possibly divide them. In some circumstances, law's 
incorporation of morality is such that the distinction between the 
two forms of existence necessarily blurs, so much so that the 
domains of experience are essentially incapable of being 
distinguished. In these instances, the label "intersection" does not 
adequately capture the relationship between law and morality, 
because their dynamic moves beyond one of merely "morality 
impacting law" to a merger or fusion of sorts. The universe of one 
becomes the universe of the other. In this light, the first point of 
emphasis requires a slight refinement: law and morality do not 
simply "intersect"; sometimes, they are non-differentiable. 
Not infrequently, law defines itself in a manner that not only 
takes account of moral sensibilities (as with, for example, a legal 
norm that codifies a discrete moral belief in a simple, direct 
manner)m but invites moral dispositions into the domain of legal 
judgment. In these circumstances, legal determinations are 
themselves moral ones, and consequently, the boundaries marking 
99 The law prohibiting murder is a simple example. It is defined to take into 
account the quality of the "guilty mind" of the offender. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL 
CODE §§ 210.1-210.2 (1962) (indicating that one is guilty of murder "if he 
purposely . . . causes the death of another human being"); MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.02(2)(a)(i) (1962) (defining "purposely" as "conscious object to engage in 
conduct"). More broadly, as a general matter, we require a mens rea for the 
criminal punishment of homicide and do not recognize the strict liability 
offense. For a treatment of homicide offenses, see KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 
25, at 291-427. 
For an example, see supra note 99. My point is to distinguish those legal 
norms that insulate legal judgment from moral considerations from those that do 
not. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
134 	 JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW 	 [VOL. 3.107 
off the two dimensions of experience are inexact. For example, 
with the Equal Protection Clause' and the Eighth Amendment's 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment,1° the content of the 
legal norm is inextricably linked—is indeed a function of—moral 
understanding.103  Put differently, the standard against which to 
measure a statute's conformity with the respective clauses, and 
therefore its legality, is a moral one.104 Similarly, if we take a step 
down in the hierarchy of norms and look at statutes themselves, 
they are at times written with the same type of direct appeal to the 
moral form of life. That is, the standard against which to measure 
the consistency of individual action with the statute is, at least in 
part, moral in character.105 When dealing with these types of legal 
101 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
102 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
103  This circumstance remains true whether one subscribes to a textualist, 
originalist, or purposivist school of interpretation. For a discussion of 
textualism, see SCALIA, supra note 4. For a discussion of originalism, see 
ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW (1990). For a discussion of purposivism, see STEPHEN J. BREYER, ACTIVE 
LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005); AHARON 
BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW (2005). 
104  Within the Anglo-American jurisprudential tradition, the work in 
inclusive legal positivism is on point here. 	 Building from its tradition's 
understanding of what counts as a rule of recognition, this school of thought 
argues that "the criteria of legality" for a legal system can include the 
substantive morality of a norm. See JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF 
PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 67-148 
(2001). (Whether exclusive legal positivism, which distinguishes between what 
the law is and the propriety of its enforcement, ultimately also supports this 
statement is unclear. On exclusive legal positivism, see, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE 
MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986) and JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 193-237 (1994).) 
From the perspective of philosophical-anthropology, two caveats are 
appropriate. First, there is a limit to the propriety of any appeal to the analytic 
jurisprudential tradition. At least with respect to foundational principles, the 
Neo-Kantian orientation of Kelsen's jurisprudence is a more accurate account of 
the positive character of law. See KELSEN, supra note 47. Second, in America, 
law begins with a political act. The People ordained and established the 
Constitution. Law does not confront the moral form of life until after this 
authoritative undertaking. Accordingly, law is in the first instance a purely 
political phenomenon, and a sharp distinction between the legal and the moral 
dimensions of experience is manifest at its source. For a discussion of the 
political origins of law, see generally KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW, supra note 1. 
For a statement of the sequential primacy of law over morality, see Kahn, 
Freedom, supra note 7 at 156 (describing the "relative priority of popular 
sovereignty over rights"). 
103  The law prohibiting manslaughter is an example. In taking account of the 
quality of the "guilty mind," the law appeals to the moral beliefs of the 
community. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.1, 210.3(1)(a) (1962) 
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norms, because legal judgment collapses to moral judgment, the 
separation of the legal and moral spheres of life is not crisp and 
well-defined. Rather, it is almost erased. And, this state of affairs 
forces us to acknowledge the above discussed phenomenological 
fact—that the distinctions by which one can characterize some 
legal experience stand alongside a more amorphous reality. 
If we combine the general understanding that law and morality 
intersect with the awareness of this bleeding into each other that 
occurs between the two cultural forms, a conclusion about their 
incommensurability follows. It should be understood in modest 
terms. The distinction between the two forms of experience is 
genuine, as well as sharp at times. Legal and moral life, however, 
also overlap and in some instances are almost one in the same. 
In parallel to this moderate account of the incommensurability 
of law and morality, the political character of lawyer behavior 
must also be carefully circumscribed. In the first instance, lawyer 
behavior is political behavior, a characteristic of lawyer action that 
will often be distinct. For example, when the prescriptions of legal 
norms conflict with moral standards of justice, lawyers are 
required to act in accordance with the mandates of law, and, 
according.ly, an understanding of lawyering as politics is 
sensible. 1°' Similarly, when the demands of law are in accordance 
with moral requirements but do not invite moral dispositions into 
the domain of legal judgment, a phenomenology of "doing" law is 
intelligible. But, in line with the blurring of the legal and moral 
forms of existence that sometimes occurs, legal and moral behavior 
will also at times blend into each other. If legal norms bring 
morality into the field of legal reasoning, lawyers will inescapably 
be "doing" morality. In these circumstances, a distinct political 
character cannot be claimed. It follows from this series of 
conditions that although lawyer behavior is political behavior, it is 
not purely so. 
(indicating that one is guilty of manslaughter "if he recklessly . . . causes the 
death of another human being") and MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962) 
(defining "recklessly" in terms of "substantial and unjustifiably risk" and "gross 
deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe 
in the actor's situation"). 
106 See, e.g., Anand, Toward an Interpretive Theory, supra note 17, at 695-
97. Cf. W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (2004). 
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B. The Privileged Status of Law's Core Beliefs for the 
Account of the Lawyer's Professional Responsibility 
Part I provided an overview of the structure of law's world. As 
stated therein, law begins as the voice of We the People. First and 
foremost, law makes manifest the People's will. Out of this 
foundational claim come other basic assertions, including that the 
rule of law is not the rule of men, is permanent, is violent, and 
applies to al1.107 These fundamental propositions, along with a 
variety of other legal paraphernalia, represent the architecture of 
the legal cosmos and define the apparatus in and through which 
law projects its universe of meaning. 
Included among the other legal paraphernalia are at least two 
additional core building blocks of law's world. As with other 
fundamental elements of law, these two propositions go to the 
heart of the legal universe and help shape its basic character. The 
particular aspects of the political order that they organize are (1) 
the jurisdictional extent of law's rule within the political order and 
(2) the relationship, under the rule of law, among the variety of 
governing norms that exist within the political order. Taken 
together, these two building blocks speak to the nature of authority 
within the political order. They tell us that, from the perspective of 
law, authority in the political order is unified. 
As a jurisdictional matter, law claims an ability to extend itself 
throughout the political order. Jurisdictionally, its reach is 
unlimited. There are no areas in which it cannot move or 
boundaries past which it cannot enter. Law is not cabined off from 
asserting its power over any type of individual or community 
behavior—for example, by an alternate political regime. Law 
makes contact with the entire political domain and the people of 
that domain are subject to its regulation in every space.'°8  
Additionally, and against the backdrop of this claim of 
universal jurisdiction, law presents the political landscape as 
hierarchically and systematically ordered. Under the rule of law, a 
graded system of norms governs the political order. The People set 
forth the Constitution. This instrument has normative priority over 
statutes and other constitutions. These devices in turn are scaled 
vis-a-vis each other and are normatively superior to common law 
107 See KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW, supra note I, at 19-27. 
108 For a summary treatment of the potential objection grounded in 
federalism (noting the ever-present possibility of constitutional amendment as 
well as the essentially unlimited reach of the Commerce Clause jurisprudence in 
the pre-Lopez era), see Anand, Legal Ethics, supra note 15, at 776 n.165. 
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rules (which themselves have normative precedence over custom). 
For purposes of the authoritative character of law's rule, the 
implementation of this taxonomy carries with it two important 
consequences. First, under this schema, every type of norm has an 
authoritative relationship with the other norms. The strength of the 
command of each norm relative to the others is defined. Second, 
and in parallel with its unencumbered jurisdictional reach, there is 
no "other" world (for example, "the common law") I09 that in some 
manner operates alongside it or to which it somehow must pay 
heed. Within this legal arrangement, law's world accounts for 
every type of "system." In sum, every type of norm is organized, 
and every type of norm is organized. 
As remarked, these jurisdictional and normative ordering 
claims of law present it as a world in which authority is unified. 
Throughout the political order, a single "chain of command" is in 
place. Importantly for purposes of this Subpart, this circumstance 
in turn reveals an understanding of the character of political 
meaning within the political order—namely, that under the rule of 
law, where authority throughout the political order is unitary, a 
united political meaning reigns"° (because in the domain of 
politics, authority grounds meaning or, put differently, meaning 
attaches to authority and manifests itself in and through 
expressions of authority). Of course, at the center of law's universe 
lie the People and the most fundamental characteristics of their 
rule—for example, that the People's rule is not that of men. 
Because (i) these beliefs are primary ones and (ii) political 
meaning is wholly integrated in law's world, these core ideas 
always manifest themselves to those who participate in law's 
universe. In today's vernacular, we might say that they "go all the 
way down." There is no circumstance in which this set of legal 
meanings does not confront the legal actor in his or her experience 
of the political order. They are never absent from political practice. 
Law's basic tenets are at all times present in political experience. 
They are ubiquitous to political activity. 
If we turn from this explication of law to its implications for 
what counts as appropriate lawyer behavior, we see that, according 
to law, "right action" requires lawyers to act in a manner that 
109 
 For some readings on the common law, see generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN 
ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (2009) and MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE 
NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988). 
11° 
 This statement reflects law's self-presentation. There is no reason to 
believe that law's symbolic universe is in fact so coherent. See KAHN, 
CULTURAL STUDY, supra note 7, at 36. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
138 	 JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW 	 [VOL. 3.107 
reflects the ubiquity of law's primary beliefs (and, more broadly, 
the integrated nature of legal meanings). Put differently, they must 
always behave in accordance with law's basic tenets. The 
reasoning is straightforward. Law insists that those who participate 
in its form of political experience maintain a behavioral practice 
that supports its universe of meaning. The omnipresence of law's 
elementary beliefs characterizes that world. Individual behavior 
must mirror this feature. Therefore, at all times, individuals—and 
particularly its representative figures—must act consistent with 
these beliefs. From the perspective of law, any conduct that fails to 
adhere to this behavioral prescription is unacceptable. 
Applying this conclusion to the variety of conventional modes 
of lawyering necessarily leads to the rejection of those practices 
that conflict with this demand of law. More broadly, the above 
account of law's self-presentation and its consequences for a 
lawyer's professional responsibility explains, in detail, why an 
analysis of lawyer conduct rooted in the core elements of law's 
world precludes a range of not uncommon, if not commonplace, 
behavior."  To summarize, in law's world, authority in the 
political order is unitary, which means that political meaning 
throughout the order is as well. If political meaning is singular, 
then the fundamental elements of law's universe are constitutive of 
all political experience. If the fundamental elements of law's 
universe are constitutive of all political experience, then law 
necessarily demands that those who take up its form of existence 
act in support of those ideas at all times. And, if law necessarily 
makes this demand, then behavior that does not satisfy this 
requirement is objectionable and prohibited. 
At the same time as the above discourse explains, in step-by-
step fashion, why an investigation of lawyer conduct grounded in 
i " It is perhaps useful to emphasize that, consistent with the philosophical-
anthropological orientation of the cultural study of the lawyer, the account 
presented here focuses on the set of beliefs that constitute the cultural form of 
law and the behavioral demands associated with that set of beliefs. That is, the 
account presented here is anthropological, as opposed to historical. Not 
surprisingly, the history of the nation's founding—and particularly the emphasis 
on civic republicanism associated with the founding—supports this structure of 
belief and its consequent ethical requirements. On the history of the founding 
and the central place of civic republicanism in it, see WOOD, supra note 55. For 
a discussion of the relationship of the civic republican tradition to lawyer ethics, 
one that is both historical and normative, see Russell G. Pearce, The Legal 
Profession as a Blue State: Reflections on Public Philosophy, Jurisprudence, 
and Legal Ethics, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339 (2006). See also Russell Pearce, 
Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolution of the 
Original Understanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. CHI. ROUNDTABLE 
381 (2001). 
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law's core beliefs denies a space for a variety of practices that are 
familiar to Americans, it also makes clear why it would be a 
mistake to attempt to defend those practices by analogizing to 
Wittgenstein and conceptualizing appropriate lawyer behavior in 
terms of a set of activities that have no underlying unity. If law 
requires all who participate in its way of being to act in conformity 
with its principal beliefs, then, by definition, ethical lawyer 
behavior will not, at its base, vary by context. Put differently, and a 
bit more expansively, law presents itself as a world in which 
political meaning is unified. Necessarily, then, the social practice 
of political meaning is fundamentally singular, not plural, in form. 
Given this fact, and law's demand for behavior that supports its 
way of being, the account of how a lawyer is to act must reflect the 
same characteristic. From the perspective of law, no other 
conceptualization of the basic shape that proper lawyering takes is 
possible."2 
The statement that a lawyer's fundamental professional 
responsibility will always look the same is one that holds internal 
to law's world. Once we acknowledge this discursive limitation, 
however, the question of grounding various conventional behaviors 
in a Wittgensteinian-type account of lawyer ethics again presents 
itself, because we now confront the complete phenomenological 
landscape of the individual in America. If law's world is not the 
only form of law that makes a claim on him or her—if multiple 
forms of law exist for the American—then the philosophical-
anthropology study of law presumably dictates that we approach 
"law" as a family of social practices. And, consistent with the 
methodology of the cultural study of the lawyer, such an 
orientation toward law would produce a conception of lawyer 
ethics that is plural in form. 
From the perspective of the cultural study of the lawyer, the 
premise of the above line of reasoning appears to fail and, 
accordingly, the ability to conceive of appropriate lawyer behavior 
as a set of fundamentally diverse activities remains impossible. 
The basis for this conclusion lies in the consideration of the 
American experience of legal authority. If multiple forms of law 
exist for the American, then he or she should respond to various 
legal authorities in his or her experience of political life. If we 
reflect on the operation of "legal" authority in the American 
political order, however, we see that the legal authority associated 
12 Beyond the basic shape of Iawyering, variation in the conceptualization 
of appropriate lawyer behavior is expected. See Anand, Legal Ethics, supra note 
15, at 773. 
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with law's world appears to be the only form of legal authority that 
exists in a compelling manner for the individual in America. I13 A 
pedagogic exercise helps illustrate this point. Imagine that one 
stands within a particular "legal area" within the American 
political order. If we inquire into the associated phenomenology, 
we find that regardless of where one is located—that is, regardless 
of the type of regime (state or federal), type of norm 
(constitutional, statutory, or common law), or type of subject 
matter (constitutional law, criminal law, private law)—the 
experience is one of the single, unified order of law's world. For 
the individual in America, the social practice of state or federal 
law, constitutional, statutory, or common law, or criminal or 
private law (or any other subject area) is always understood as part 
of the whole that is law's rule.114 
The direction in which the individual in America looks for 
legal guidance supports this conclusion. In America, the final 
determination of legality always lies with the U.S. Supreme Court, 
which is understood to represent the voice of the People."5  
Conversely, when the Court hands down a decision, the ruling is 
followed, a circumstance that holds true irrespective of the 
substance of the Court's dictate. There is no other locus of legal 
authority—for example, an alternate sovereign or reason itself—to 
whom one appeals for ultimate direction, and to whom one 
adheres. In America, law's rule reigns, and appears to do so by 
itself "6 
113  This statement requires qualification. For the individual whose political 
self is organized around the terms of post-modern forms of politics, an alternate 
form of legal authority—particularly one grounded in the international legal 
order—may have currency. In reflecting on the nature of politics in a twenty-
first century international legal order, one might consider the challenge 
presented by CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (George Schwab 
trans., Univ. Chi. Press 1996) (1927) (arguing that the friend-enemy distinction 
is the orienting category unique to political experience). 
114 Cf. Kahn, Freedom, supra note 7, at 142 n.2. But cf Posner, supra note 
53, at 49-50 (arguing that a distinct Aristotelian conception of law informs 
American legal experience). 
115 But cj: id. at 52-53 (arguing that the Court is not central to American 
political life). For one account of the problematic character of this analysis, see 
supra note 53. 
116  An interesting illustration of the dominance of law's world on the 
American legal imagination lies in the work of Carla Pratt. At a basic level, Pratt 
convincingly argues for the application of the core principle of equal justice to 
requirements for admission to the bar. See Carla D. Pratt, Should Klansmen Be 
Lawyers? Racism as an Ethical Barrier to the Legal Profession, 30 FLA. ST. U. 
L. Rtiv. 857 (2003). 
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If this phenomenology is the only available experience of legal 
authority for the individual in America, then the appropriate 
conceptualization of law, in the first instance, is as a single cultural 
practice, and not as a manifold one. For the philosophical-
anthropological study of law in America, there is in the end only 
one object of inquiry. It follows that the basic intellectual 
orientation of the project does not itself lead to an understanding of 
lawyer ethics that allows for fundamentally multiple ways of 
acting.117 
C. The Proper Use of "Legal" Vocabulary 
In its effort to maintain itself as an autonomous universe of 
meaning, law necessarily makes a claim of what counts as 
practicing "law" and as being "legal" in character. The appropriate 
use of the terms will always be one in which the referent is law's 
set of beliefs. Those actions and ideas that harmonize with law's 
world are properly understood in this vocabulary. Those actions 
and ideas that do not are correctly described using some other 
words. Of course, this position lies internal to law's world. Within 
those boundaries, it has currency. But to what extent does this 
linguistic understanding hold at a more general level? From an 
outside perspective, does this definition of the terms sustain itself? 
Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is yes. Law's claim to the 
terms does have a privileged status in the descriptions of our 
observations and ideas. And it does so because of the fact of the 
existence and self-integrity of a cultural form. That fact constrains 
discourse to just the extent at issue. That is, it requires dialogue to 
H7 At this point, it is perhaps useful to comment on the relationship between 
the cultural study of the lawyer's understanding of ethical lawyer conduct and 
adversarial lawyering, which is the basic form of law practice in the United 
States. While the project rejects a range of familiar action associated with 
adversarial lawyering, this denial does not translate into a preclusion of 
adversarial lawyering in a wholesale fashion. Rather, it represents a challenge to 
what adversarial lawyering looks like. Once we recognize that law is a cultural 
form and that law has an inherent normativity, then the architecture of law's 
world frames the account of lawyer ethics in an adversarial context. Lawyers 
will still find themselves in opposing positions. (Adversarial advocacy is an 
institutionalized part of the American practice of law.) For the cultural study of 
the lawyer, the task is to explain how lawyers are to understand their 
professional responsibilities in such an environment. See Anand, Legal Ethics, 
supra note 15, at 751-52, 782-83. As noted in the Introduction to this Part, 
previous articles have provided various examples of what practicing law within 
the adversarial system looks like. I leave the more complete picture of practicing 
law within the adversarial system, including the detailed treatment of the 
lawyer's relationship to his or her nominal "client," to future work. 
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maintain consistency with the cultural form's own understanding 
of the appropriate use of derivative terms, at least within the 
discursive context within which the cultural form operates. A 
consideration of the proper use of language in our religious 
discourse is instructive. 
From the perspective of the scholar, religion is a cultural 
form."' In our thinking about religious matters, we acknowledge 
the existence and self-integrity of religious forms and, accordingly, 
understand that to legitimately describe a person or particular 
practice as "of a specific religion," the essential character of that 
religion must inhere in him, her, or it. I19 To speak in disregard of 
this limitation is to engage in a mistaken, if not meaningless, 
discourse. Quite simply, if we did put forth such an account, what 
are we saying? (At best, such a nomination would represent a 
confusion of categories, namely "of the religion" versus "like the 
religion.") 
We can see this point if we reflect on what valid discourse with 
respect to the dominant religious tradition in the West looks like. .  
In our thoughts about Christianity, the basic beliefs of this religion 
necessarily constrain the understanding of what counts as 
practicing Christianity and as being Christian in character. I2° For 
118  As indicated, this statement is from the perspective of the scholar. Such 
an orientation is not a challenge to the religious individual and is not intended to 
denirate his or her beliefs in any way. 
19  To be clear, in speaking of the essential character of a religion, my 
intention is not to embrace an idea of essentialism in religious forms and, 
correspondingly, to reject the arguments of prototype theory. My point is only 
that there is a substantive criterion that is basic to, and constitutive of, a religious 
form. For a discussion of prototype theory, see GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, 
AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 
(1987). For an appeal to prototype theory in the conceptualization of a specific 
religion, see GAVIN FLOOD, AN INTRODUCTION TO HINDUISM 6-8 (1996). 
120 My point here is not to argue for an essential definition of Christianity, 
although it is equally not to argue against a standard that goes beyond a mere 
instrumental agreement. Words may have no ontological grounding (concepts 
drive an understanding of reality, not the other way around), but the fact that 
they are, in this sense, a convention does not make them merely conventional, or 
at least not always. There are some "non-negotiables" that constrain application, 
at least some of the time. The examples presented above are illustrative. For a 
general discussion of essentialism in language, one might begin with 
Wittgenstein. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 89. For a not unimportant 
discussion of Wittgenstein's relation to Kant, see DAVID PEARS, LUDWIG 
WITTGENSTEIN (1969). Wittgenstein's account is hardly unproblematic, 
particularly its underlying claim that critique and description appropriately focus 
on use. To offer just one reason to question Wittgenstein's treatment of this 
subject, the construction of knowledge (and therefore meaning) occurs in and 
through a conceptual apparatus, i.e. "simultaneity in construction," not "use 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol3/iss1/5
2010] ADVANCING THE CULTURAL STUDY OF THE LAWYER 
	 143 
example, in considering religious ethics, for an action to count as 
Christian, it has to reflect the principle of universal love. 121  
Similarly, in the context of religious identity, to rightfully label 
someone a Christian, he or she must believe in the theological 
significance of Jesus. I22 In the absence of this limitation—that to 
deem a particular person or activity as "of Christianity," the 
fundamental ideas around which Christianity is organized must be 
constitutive of him, her, or it—discussion is unintelligible. 
In just the same way that a religious form sets boundaries to 
discourse, so too does the cultural form of law. The fact of law's 
existence and self-integrity means that any serious use of the 
related terminology carries with it the meanings associated with 
law's core tenets. For example, those things "legal" are necessarily 
tied to law's world. Thus, in the context of legal identity, to be a 
member of the "legal" profession, an individual must be committed 
to We the People.123 Similarly, in our thinking about legal ethics, 
"legal" action must manifest the basic principles of law's world. 
Because the cultural form of law does have an entitlement to 
"legal" vocabulary, we can justifiably criticize as misidentified 
those actions and ideas that claim the language but do not comport 
with the criteria for its utilization. In such instances, individuals are 
engaging in some other type of action or work, one that cannot be 
correctly designated as "of law." For example, law maintains that it 
resolves disputes in a principled manner. Rules of law, not those of 
men, determine outcomes. At the same time, many individuals 
assert that they are "lawyers" and are "practicing law," and 
simultaneously approach dispute resolution under law from a 
result-oriented perspective. In such a situation, it is correct to reject 
these individuals' claims to the nomenclature. What they are doing 
comes first," is the appropriate characterization in our thinking about this topic. 
See KANT, supra note 56. (For a more contemporary form of Kantian 
epistemology that recognizes the diversity of epistemic structures, see, e.g.., 
CASSIRER, SYMBOLIC FORMS, supra note 8). 
121 Notably, Augustine rooted just war, in part, in love. See, e.g., ROLAND 
H. BAINTON, CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR & PEACE: A HISTORICAL 
SURVEY AND CRITICAL RE-EVALUATION 96-97 (1960). 
122 Accordingly, it is not clear that an individual who accepted the 
conclusions of the Jesus Seminar could legitimately be called a Christian. For 
some literature associated with the Jesus Seminar, see ROBERT W. FUNK & ROY 
W. HOOVER, THE FIVE GOSPELS: THE SEARCH FOR THE AUTHENTIC WORDS OF 
JESUS (1993) and ROBERT W. FUNK, THE ACTS OF JESUS: THE SEARCH FOR THE 
AUTHENTIC DEEDS OF JESUS (1998). 
123 For the cultural study of the lawyer, lawyer identity is thick identity, not 
thin. This embrace of thickness stands in contrast to the turn to thinness that is 
reflected in Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. 
Cow. L. REV. I (2003). 
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is not appropriately described in the language of law.124 Likewise, 
law demands, as repeatedly stated, that those who take up its form 
of political existence embrace the tenets of its world. Meanwhile, 
many scholars describe their work as providing an account of 
"legal ethics" and concurrently interrogate the role of the lawyer 
without directly appealing to these ideas in the course of their 
study. Once again, we can rightly deny the characterization, 
because this scholarship is not properly represented in the terms of 
"legal" vocabulary.125 
While the argument presented here is likely challenging to 
some, it is perhaps uniquely provocative to the legal ethicist 
because of the opposition it presents to the nature of his or her 
work. In light of this circumstance, some additional discussion of 
the claim is useful to help crystallize the distinction that is being 
made here. This discussion involves a continuation of the analogy 
between the cultural form of Christianity and that of law. 
Above we remarked that the basic beliefs of Christianity 
necessarily constrain the legitimate use of terms like "Christian." If 
we apply this fact to the category of "Christian ethics," it follows 
that for behavior to fall under this rubric, the core ideas of 
Christianity must be constitutive of it. Similarly, to qualify as the 
study of this subject, the relevant inquiry must focus on the same 
type of conduct. The label "the study of Christian ethics" operates 
under this same linguistic parameter. Moving forward with our 
reasoning, and with this understanding of what counts as "the 
study of Christian ethics" in mind, we can consider alternate forms 
of analysis of "Christian behavior" and ask about their appropriate 
characterization. For example, it is certainly possible to engage in 
an Islamic or Judaic interrogation of Christian practices and come 
to an understanding of what is and is not "right" behavior internal 
to that perspective. Such an account is entirely valid. But, what is 
its correct description? More precisely, can we supplement our 
understanding of what it means to study Christian ethics and 
124  The actions of these individuals are properly described in the language of 
"political action" (i.e. these individuals are "practicing political action"). For the 
treatment of this fairly nuanced matter, at least with respect to civil litigators, 
see Anand, Contemporary Civil Litigation, supra note 16. See also supra note 
26. 
125  Typically, this scholarship is organized around the basic concepts of the 
American cultural form of morality, which is principally deontological in 
character and should be understood as providing an account of "moral ethics." 
For the most powerful treatment of the role of the lawyer from a moral 
perspective, see LUI3AN, supra note 21. On the deontological character of the 
American cultural form of morality, see supra note 25. 
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properly label such a treatment of the Christian role as also "the 
study of Christian ethics?" 
The answer is no. This type of analysis does not qualify as the 
study of Christian ethics because it fails to adhere to the linguistic 
constraints that exist for discourse. As stated, to be appropriately 
considered "the study of Christian ethics," the core beliefs of 
Christianity must be constitutive of the conduct of focus. With 
respect to an Islamic or Judaic interrogation of Christian practices, 
however, the central tenets of these religious forms inform the 
behavior of concern, not those of Christianity. Ultimately, with this 
type of analysis, the focus is on Islamic or Judaic conduct, and not 
Christian action. To categorize this form of inquiry as "of 
Christianity," then, is an inapt use of language. The accurate 
characterization of such an investigation is in the terms of critique. 
This type of analysis is an assessment of Christian ethics from an 
alternate point of view. 
By a parallel manner of reasoning, we can differentiate legal 
ethics—that is, the ethics of law's world—from its assessment 
from any other perspective,' 26 including the moral perspective.' 27 
As with the Islamic or Judaic inquiry into Christian practices, any 
such account of lawyer behavior is perfectly valid. Indeed, for 
those who internalize the norms of the particular disposition at 
issue, this type of investigation has affirmative value. But 
regardless of how legitimate or worthwhile this kind of pursuit is, 
we cannot justifiably attach the label "legal" to the endeavor. It is 
not properly described in the terms of law's world. Rather, it is 
126 
 This state of affairs suggests the problematic character of Christian legal 
ethics scholarship. For some examples of the literature of this subfield, see 
generally THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER (1981); 
Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 
963 (1987); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary 
Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REV. 697 (1988); CAN A GOOD CHRISTIAN BE A GOOD 
LAWYER? HOMILIES, WITNESSES, AND REFLECTIONS (Thomas E. Baker & 
Timothy W. Floyd eds., 1998) and Joseph G. Allegretti, Can Legal Ethics Be 
Christian?, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 453 (Michael W. 
McConnell et al. eds., 2001). 
127 
 As indicated in footnote 125, the standard form of "legal ethics" 
scholarship is as a moral approach to the role of the lawyer (hence the textual 
reference to the "moral assessment" of lawyer ethics). Supra note 125. It should 
be noted that, for the most part, in its consideration of the role of the lawyer, this 
scholarship does not acknowledge law as a cultural form (and thus, the moral 
assessment it provides is not, strictly speaking, a critique of lawyer ethics qua 
the ethics of law's world). 
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properly described on its own terms (for example, in the language 
of the cultural form of morality).128 
The more detailed philosophical accounts presented here 
hopefully enhance the credibility of the cultural study of the 
lawyer's methodology and, accordingly, strengthen the persuasive 
character of the project's analyses of the lawyer's professional 
responsibility, which, as Part I described, represents the second 
half of the project's scholarly agenda. This Article now turns to 
one such analysis: a comparative inquiry into the normative 
demands of law and those of economics. To state again the 
qualifications to the discourse, the concern of Part III is with the 
most basic of these demands, which lie in significant part in 
conflict with one another. Consequently, the discourse (a) 
emphasizes difference and (b) is foundational and narrow-ranging. 
Additionally, to repeat the intention of the discussion, Part III has a 
defined purpose: to establish that, at the fundamental level, a 
lawyer is not an economic person.129 
III. LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE NORMATIVE 
INQUIRY 
The earlier discussion in Subpart IIA built from the fact of the 
incommensurability of cultural forms. The concern of that Subpart 
was to develop a more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon 
of incommensurability, particularly as presented in the relationship 
128  For this reason, it is a mistake to think that the question presented to the 
legal ethics scholar is "What are the moral obligations of a lawyer?" Rather, the 
question presented is "What are the legal obligations of a lawyer?" or, given that 
law is a cultural form of politics, "What are the political obligations of a 
lawyer?" For an expression of the former understanding of the question 
presented, see, e.g., RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 29, at 3 (stating that legal 
ethics "concerns the most fundamental moral aspects of our lives as lawyers"). 
An important qualification to this challenge to conventional legal ethics 
scholarship lies in the fact that the rule of law may very well be a dying set of 
meanings for the American citizen. Under an alternate understanding of law, 
which is presumably an instrumental one, the argument for legal ethics as the 
moral analysis of lawyering has currency. 
129  Consistent with this turn to the second-half of the cultural study of the 
lawyer's scholarly agenda, Part III does not take up a discourse on the 
incommensurability of the cultural forms of law and economics and its 
associated details. It should be noted, however, that for purposes of this paper, 
the assertion that law and economics are incommensurable is intended as a 
modest one, in line with the discussion on Subpart IIA. 
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between law and morality. Put differently, the focus was on 
improving the intelligibility of the phenomenon of 
incommensurability, again specifically with respect to the law-
morality dynamic. If we turn away from a concern with the 
phenomenon's intelligibility and consider the philosophical 
implications associated with its fact, at least one important 
conclusion arises. There exists a normative equality among cultural 
forms. That is, no cultural form—be it religion, morality, science, 
art, law, or any other symbolic medium—holds a privileged place 
in our thinking about how we ought to live. The reasoning that 
drives this conclusion is straightforward. If, at their fundament, 
cultural forms cannot be compared, then the way of life of one can 
never be superior to that of another. I3°  
From an intellectual standpoint, this state of affairs is hardly 
trivial. Rather, it gives rise to a need to reorient our theoretical 
sensibilities. Specifically, it demands that we reconceptualize the 
field of ethics.13I Instead of understanding the moral form of 
experience as defining "right action," we now must make sense of 
the discipline of ethics in more bounded terms—as taking up the 
question of how we are to live internal to a cultural form. More 
precisely, given the inherent normative character of a cultural 
form, we now must understand the subject of ethics to be an 
investigation of the manner by which one supports a particular 
form of meaning. I32 
Naturally, this restructuring of the field of ethics lends itself to 
comparative study—how the behavioral demands of one cultural 
form differ from those of another—the importance of which this 
Article's conclusion will underscore. As indicated, this Part 
considers the competing demands that attach to participation in the 
cultural form of law and the cultural form of economics at the most 
basic level. To lay the groundwork for the discussion, a series of 
preliminary comments is necessary. 
First, it is presumably clear to the reader that, as a general 
matter, a comparative normative inquiry requires a command of 
the elemental structure of the relevant cultural forms. As 
previously indicated, the substantive content of a normative 
demand is a direct function of a cultural form's conceptual 
architecture. For the comparative normative inquiry taken up here, 
which considers the core aspects of the relevant cultural forms, this 
13° See Anand, Legal Ethics, supra note 15, at 771-72. 
131 
 More precisely, the concern here is with normative ethics. For a relevant 
comment, see Anand, Legal Ethics, supra note 15, at 771, n. 147. 
132 V. KAHN, LIBERALISM supra note 42, at 149 ("Every metaphysics 
supports a moral and political practice that 'makes sense' within such a world."). 
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requirement translates into a need to comprehend the principal 
concepts that are constitutive of the worlds of law and economics, 
or, more precisely, those principal concepts within which the 
tensions between the two worlds inhere. Of course, this Article has 
already made reference to a variety of the fundamental ideas of the 
cultural form of law, at various points and at different levels of 
detail. To appropriately engage the comparative inquiry, a degree 
of repeat presentation is required. Specifically, three concepts basic 
to law's world require reintroduction. As the above statement 
regarding the necessary objects for understanding suggests, these 
elements are the proper point of focus for the comparative analysis 
presented here, because they mark the critical points of contact 
with the core elemental structure of the cultural form of 
economics, and thus provide the natural axis of orientation for the 
comparative assessment of the two cultural forms' most basic 
competing claims on behavior. To note, in making the necessary 
repeat presentation, this Part briefly expands on the prior 
explication of the three fundamental propositions. And to be clear, 
in providing these descriptions, this Part relies on the work of the 
cultural study of law. 
Second, with respect to the basic normative demands that arise 
out of these three core elements, two such directives have also 
been previously referenced (although not explicitly identified as 
basic normative demands of law), and in a similar vein, they too 
must be re-presented. This Part also introduces the reader to one 
more fundamental prescription for lawyer conduct. 
Third, the three basic demands of law to be described, as well 
as that of economics (there is in fact only one), should not be 
construed to necessarily define an exhaustive list of each cultural 
form's fundamental commands on behavior. The prescriptions 
identified in what follows represent the end product of the current 
state of reflection. It is possible, and hopefully true, that additional 
understandings of the basic normative characters of law and 
economics will reveal themselves with future work. In this light, a 
basic claim of this Article—that it explores the rival normative 
demands that each cultural form puts forth, at the foundational 
level—requires a qualification. This Article does take up this task, 
in the sense that to do so is to clarify the distinction between being 
a lawyer and being an economic person (an undertaking for which 
the identified prescriptions are sufficient). This Article does not 
take up this task in a more comprehensive sense, or at least it does 
not purport to. Whether additional material to support its 
conclusion is available remains to be seen. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol3/iss1/5
2010] ADVANCING THE CULTURAL STUDY OF THE LAWYER 	 149 
Fourth, with respect to the cultural form of economics, a 
consideration vis-à-vis its initial conceptualization presents itself. 
This Article has, throughout its discourse, consistently referred to 
economics as a "cultural form." Economics is just that. It is an 
entry point into the world, a medium in and through which to make 
sense of things.133 As with law, as well as other symbolic 
mediums, economics presents a complete ordering of reality, and 
in and through that experiential structure, provides the participant 
in its universe a rich way of being.134 Importantly, this 
conceptualization is not a purely abstract one—for example, that 
economics is, in theory, a way of ordering reality. Rather, this 
conceptualization is tied to concrete action. The cultural form of 
economics is, like all cultural forms, actively practiced.135 It is a 
manner by which individuals, at least in the United States, in fact 
relate to the world, as the examples presented in this Part help 
demonstrate.' 36 
Fifth, with respect to the structure of this cultural form, and 
more precisely, its substantive character, the conception of 
economics that informs this Article is, to be explicit, neo-classical 
economics. Neo-classical economics is the school of thought that 
133 Cf., Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, in 
GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 3 (1976). 
134 For an interesting discussion that acknowledges economics as "a way of 
looking at the world," but resists defining it as a form of knowledge, see 
RONALD H. COASE, Economics and Contiguous Disciplines, in ESSAYS ON 
ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS 34 (1994). 
135 An interesting example of this phenomenon is found in the study of legal 
ethics. In their casebook, Deborah Rhode and David Luban conceptualize the 
study of lawyer advertising, solicitation of clients, attorney's fees, and related 
matters as "market regulation" and introduce the subject with an introduction to 
some basic economic terms. (To be clear, such packaging is pedagogically 
appropriate.) RHODE & EUBAN, supra note 29, at 756-57. 
1 6 As a matter of economic theory, neo-classicism (which, as indicated in 
the next paragraph of text, is the conception of economics that informs this 
Article) strives to be predictive, as opposed to descriptive, and indeed both 
acknowledges its limited descriptive accuracy and insists on the propriety of this 
character of its research. It also disclaims a normative dimension to its analysis. 
These tenets of neo-classicism imply a considered distance of the self vis-à-vis 
neo-classical economic research. However accurate such a characterization is, it 
does not hold with respect to the general member of American society, who in 
fact internalizes the terms of neo-classicism into a way of life. For the most 
well-known statement, and defense, of neo-classical economics' predictive 
orientation, see MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in 
ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3 (1953). For an important response, see 
Ronald H. Coase, flow Should Economists Choose?, in COASE, supra note 134, 
at IS. 
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dominates American economic psychology.I37 In the Academy, it 
holds a privileged place in economics departments and is the 
representative school of thought for economic thinking that takes 
place in other disciplines. I38 Perhaps more importantly, in the 
formation of American public policy, when economic 
considerations are involved, the principles of neo-classical 
economic theory structure the terms of debate and often lie, at least 
ostensibly, at the foundation of legislation.I39 Because of the 
central place that neo-classical theory occupies in the American 
137 Neo-classical economics is, at present, the dominant economic theory in 
the United States, and one that supports a form of capitalism. Both capitalist and 
non-capitalist alternatives to neo-classical economic theory exist. Capitalist 
approaches to the economic order that are not neo-classical in form include that 
of traditional institutionalist economics. For an introduction to institutional 
economic theory, see, e.g., GEOFFREY M. HODGSON, What is the Essence of 
Institutional Economics, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 
399 (David M. Hausman ed., 3d. ed. 2008) and Walter H. Hamilton, The 
Institutional Approach to Economic Theory, 9 AM. ECON. REV. 309-18 
(Supplement 1919). See also THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE 
CLASS: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS (1899) and JOHN R. COMMONS, 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: ITS PLACE IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1934). It is 
perhaps worth noting that the capitalism of Adam Smith did not take the form 
that neo-classical economics supports, at least when understood in the context of 
Smith's moral orientation. See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL 
SENTIMENTS (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., Liberty Classics 1982) (6th ed. 
1790); ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS (Henry Regnery Co. 1953) (1776). Non-capitalist 
approaches to economic production include those grounded in a Marxist 
ideology, as well as rooted in the ideology of Gross National Happiness. For an 
introduction to the former, see THE MARX-ENGELS READER (Robert C. Tucker 
ed., 2d ed. 1978). For an introduction to the latter, see MARK MANCALL, Gross 
National Happiness and Development: An Essay, in GROSS NATIONAL 
HAPPINESS AND DEVELOPMENT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON OPERATIONALIZATION OF GROSS NATIONAL HAPPINESS 1 
(Karma Ura & Karma Galay eds., 2004). 
138 Typically, such thinking takes the label of "rational choice" analysis. 
See, e.g., GARY W. COX & MATTHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGLISLATIVE 
LEVIATHAN (2d ed. 2007); MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE 
WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (2d ed. 1989); SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE 
RATIONAL PEASANT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RURAL SOCIETY IN VIETNAM 
(1979) and KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 
(1992). 
139  The deregulation of the California energy market in the 1990s was 
ostensibly rooted in the economic logic of neo-classicism. See, e.g, Spencer 
Michels, Power Play, ONLINE NEwSHOUR, Dec. 16, 1996, available at 
http://www.pbs.orginewshouribb/economy/december96/power_12  -16. html ( last 
visited on Jan. 15, 2010) (discussing "California's plan to bring competition to 
the power industry"). 
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economic imagination,140 it is the appropriate focal point for 
analysis. 
In what follows, this Part presents its discussion in three steps. 
Initially, it paints its picture of the cultural form of law and its 
normative demands, with the measure of repeat presentation 
described. Subsequently, it offers the analogous portrait of the 
cultural form of economics and its normative demand. Finally, it 
brings the two discussions together, offering the relevant 
comparison of the respective normative demands. Not surprisingly, 
this last discussion is succinct, due to its largely applied character. 
A. The Cultural Form of Law and Its Basic Normative 
Demands 
Three previously mentioned elements of law's world are 
central to the comparative study of the normative demands 
associated with the legal and economic ways of life, at the basic 
level. Those ideas structure an understanding of three aspects of 
the political order: (i) its origin, (ii) who governs the political order 
and who is governed under the political order, and (iii) the political 
order's temporal character. The ideas themselves are that the rule 
of law is a representation of popular sovereignty, is not the rule of 
men, and is permanent. Below, this Subpart presents an account of 
each concept, as well as examples of its cultural expression. 
Subsequently, this subpart delineates three basic demands that 
arise out of the concepts, along with relevant illustrations. 
To begin, law's world is a representation of popular 
sovereignty:41 The political order manifests the People's will. The 
People are the sovereign authority, and, first and foremost, the 
political order signifies their voice. Its meaning is that it denotes 
140 In recent years, cognitive psychology has begun to present a challenge to 
the "rational actor" assumption of neo-classical economics. For an introduction 
to this work, see DANIEL KAHNEMAN, PAUL SLOVIC, & Amos TVERSKY, 
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982) and; 
THOMAS GILOVICH, DALE W. GRIFFIN, & DANIEL KAHNEMAN, 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (2002). 
Behavioral law and economics is the school of thought that applies this work to 
law. For an introduction to behavioral law and economics, see Christine Jolls, 
Cass R. Sunstein and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). For some criticisms of behavioral 
law and economics, see Richard Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral 
Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998) and Mark Kelman, 
Behavioral Economics as Part of a Rhetorical Duet: A Response to foils, 
Sunstein and Thaler, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1577 (1998). 
141  KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW, supra note 1, at 23-24. 
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the People's will. This idea is reflected in the most prominent—or 
"first"—symbol of law's universe. "We the People" ordained and 
established the Constitution (out of which, as the earlier discourse 
on political authority and political meaning described, the entire 
political order flows). 
Additionally, because the rule of law is a representation of 
popular sovereignty, it is not the rule of Mer1.142 That is, law's 
world is the rule of no one. The political order operates 
independent of the interests of specific individuals or groups. 
Equally, it is indifferent to the impact of political activity on these 
concerns.
143 Politics is non-personal, and is stripped of the 
particularity of the self. This tenet of law's world finds expression 
in a variety of concrete understandings that Americans have about 
the political order, both formal and substantive. For example, with 
respect to the former, in America nobody is above the law and all 
have equal standing.144 With respect to the latter, purely self-
interested lawmaking is unacceptable, I45 as is judicial decision-
making of this sort. 146 
142 Id. at 21-23. 
143 Id. at 23 (noting that law "den(ies) that the source of meaning of an event lies 
in its novelty"). 
144 In hearings on "Wartime Executive Power and the NSA's Surveillance 
Authority," Senator Patrick Leahy offered the following statement: 
The President and the Justice Department have a constitutional 
duty to faithfully execute the laws. They do not write the laws. 
They do not pass the laws. They do not have unchecked 
powers to decide what laws to follow, and . . . what laws to 
ignore. They cannot violate the law or the rights of ordinary 
Americans. 
. . . [fin America, . . . nobody is above the law, not even the 
President of the United States. 
Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency 's Surveillance 
Authority: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 8 
(2006) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). Similarly, Senator John Kerry, in a 
statement approving the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene v. Bush, 
553 U.S. 723 (2008), asserted the following: "The Constitution and the rule of 
law bind all of us even in extraordinary times of war. No one is above the 
Constitution." Press Release, Office of Senator John Kerry, Kerry Responds to 
Supreme Court Decision on Habeas Corpus (June 12, 2008), available at 
http://kerry.senate.gov/press/release/?id=b186d877-ed56-4cc8-baa3-  
38dbea62c3c5. 
145 Cf. Unger, .supra note 14, at 588 ("All contemporary versions of the 
democratic ideal . . . share a minimal core: the state must not fall permanently 
hostage to a faction, however broadly the term faction may be defined so as to 
include social classes, segments of the workforce, parties of opinion, or any 
other stable collective category."). 
146 s
ee, e.g., Ian Urbina, Despite Red Flags About Judges, A Kickback 
Scheme Flourished, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2009, at A 1. 
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Finally, the rule of law is permanent. I47 The political order 
extends through time and can change only when the People 
reconstruct it.148 In the absence of such a reassertion of will, the 
voice of the People, as given, governs. This understanding—of the 
enduring quality of law's rule—represents itself in at least two 
aspects of American political life. At a relatively superficial level 
of experience, the permanent character of the rule of law grounds 
the American association of predictability and order with law. 
More deeply, this attribute is part of what makes possible 
American historical experience. As foreign a thought as it may be 
for some, the American experience of community—an inherently 
intergenerational concept—occurs in and through the rule of law. 
The American political narrative is a legal narrative (one which is, 
at a minimum, a story of the advancement of Enlightenment values 
in and through the rule of law). As Paul Kahn has correctly noted, 
"Without (law), what would link current citizens to past and future 
generations? Not blood, not language, not even a common 
heritage. This is a nation of immigrants, with deep differences in 
each of these areas."149  For the American citizen, the rule of law is 
the tie that binds across time.I50 In part, that tie is a product of 
law's permanence. 
The explication of these three constituent ideas of law gives 
rise to three fundamental behavioral claims that the cultural 
practice makes on the lawyer. These demands take the form of an 
overarching command for a definitive type of action, as well as 
two additional obligations. Together, they comprise the foundation 
of a lawyer's professional responsibility. 
As a matter of first principles, the belief that the People are 
sovereign prescribes a baseline for what counts as appropriate 
lawyer action. If law's world begins as the manifestation of the 
People's will, then, first and foremost, a lawyer's conduct must 
147 KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW, supra note 1, at 19-21. 
148 Constitutional amendment itself is not necessarily the mark of a new 
beginning, i.e. of a new republic. For a discussion of constitutional amendment 
as law reform versus constitutional amendment as reappearance of the People, 
see id. at 63-64. 
149 /d at 213. 
'5 )` It should be noted that in this age when modern forms of politics 
confront post-modern forms of politics, the rule of law may be a dying set of 
meanings. For an earlier comment in this same vein, see supra note 128. The 
contested character of American political experience should also again be noted. 
See supra note 65. 
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conform to that will. Whatever the lawyer does, his or her actions 
must reflect the voice of the People.151  
Beyond this all-encompassing demand, the three beliefs 
operate in conjunction with one another to produce two further 
fundamental requirements for lawyer conduct. First, if the People 
are sovereign, not particular individuals or groups, and are so 
indefinitely, then a lawyer must respect particular rules of law—
the express wishes of the People—and act in a manner that makes 
manifest the various norms' purposes. Put succinctly, he or she 
must adhere to "the law," a prescription that translates into a 
variety of concrete requirements for a lawyer. For example, he or 
she may not engage in acts of civil disobedience,I52 must avoid 
filing pleadings that have no chance of success on their merits,153 
must otherwise refrain from conduct that corrupts the practice of 
law,154 and must follow rules of law in his or her own more 
individualized behavior (for example, in filing his or her taxes). 
Second, because the rule of law is that of the People, and not of 
anyone in particular, a lawyer must not concern him- or herself 
with the specific character of any self—either his or her own, or 
those of another person or other persons. This aspect of a lawyer's 
professional responsibility—the duty to acknowledge the 
impersonal character of politics and deny the particularity of 
151  For further elaboration on the basic structure of this ethical demand, 
including a general comment on distinctions between required and permitted 
behavior, as well as their variability, see Anand, Legal Ethics, supra note 15, at 
773-74. 
152 Anand, Toward an Interpretive Theory, supra note 17, at 695-97. 
153 Anand, Legal Ethics, supra note 15, at 780-81. For some writings of 
judges testifying to the determinate character of law, see, e.g., Harry T. 
Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the "Politics" of Judging: 
Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619, 619 
(1985) ("[M]ost decisions of the [D.C. Circuit] court of appeals are rendered 
pursuant to well-established tenets of law and issued without dissent.") and 
Edwards, supra note 75. See also, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS 20 (1921) ("Stare decisis is at least the everyday working 
rule of our law. I shall have something to say later about the propriety of 
relaxing the rule in exceptional conditions. But unless those conditions are 
present, the work of deciding cases in accordance with precedents that plainly fit 
them is a process similar in its nature to that of deciding cases in accordance 
with a statute. It is a process of search, comparison, and little more.") and 
AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 41 (Yadin Kaufmann trans., Yale Univ. 
Press 1989) ("The accepted view is that most of the cases that come before the 
courts are not hard cases."). The jurisprudential account of the hard case is most 
closely associated with the work of H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin. See 
generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994) and RONALD 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
154 Anand, Legal Ethics, supra note 15, at 780-82. 
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selves—similarly translates into specific obligations for the lawyer. 
Among other things, he or she cannot choose whom he or she 
represents based on normative considerations (as the concept is 
conventionally understood). That is, selective representation 
founded on normative grounds is prohibited. I55 Additionally, he or 
she cannot engage a controversial political or ideological issue 
beyond contributing his or her expertise.156 Accordingly, it is 
inappropriate for a bar association to endorse a nuclear weapons 
freeze initiative, request Congress to refrain from enacting a guest-
worker program, engage in conduct that is directed at the reform of 
law (beyond contributing its professional expertise), etc.157  
In the first instance, law's world demands that the lawyer 
serves the People. Moreover, he or she must respect particular 
rules of law and not concern him- or herself with the specific 
character of any self. These normative understandings define the 
basic set of practices to which a lawyer must adhere in order to 
fulfill his or her obligations associated with participation in the 
cultural form of law. If we place this normative arrangement to the 
side of our discussion, for a moment, we can explore the cultural 
form of economics, and the basic prescription on behavior that it 
sets forth for the economic person. 
B. The Cultural Form of Economics and Its Basic Normative 
Demand 
Three core elements of the conceptual architecture of 
economics are relevant to the comparative inquiry, each structuring 
an understanding of a particular aspect of the economic world. 
Those aspects are the nature of the economic individual, the reality 
that surrounds him or her, and a distinct, ontological fact that 
undergirds that reality. The corresponding tenets are that (1) the 
economic individual makes rational decisions that maximize his or 
her self-interest, (2) everything that he or she confronts is an object 
of interest, and (3) markets exist (and coordinate his or her interest-
seeking behavior). As in Subpart A, this Subpart presents an 
account of each concept, as well as examples of its cultural 
expression. Additionally, this subpart explicates a specific 
orientation that lies behind this conceptual framework, and 
particularly behind the first conceptual element (an explication that 
is necessary for the desired account of the economic world). 
155 Anand, The Role of the Lawyer, supra note 17. 
156 Id  
157 Id. 
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Finally, again in parallel with Subpart A, this Subpart delineates 
the basic normative demand that arises out of the core concepts, 
along with relevant illustrations. In doing so, the analysis makes 
clear why this cultural practice effects a single fundamental ethical 
principle. 
To begin, the individual makes rational decisions that 
maximize his or her self-interest. t58 That is, in a given 
circumstance, he or she makes calculated choices that garner him 
or her the greatest personal utility.159 This tenet of the economic 
universe manifests itself in the familiar American account of 
individual and collective behavior in terms of assessing 
opportunity costs, I6° performing cost-benefit analyses, I61 acting 
efficiently, I62 and creating and responding to incentives, among 
other things. 
Next, everything that one confronts is an object of interest, I63 a 
state of affairs that is understood literally: all things are thought of 
158 Becker, supra note 133, at 5 (discussing the maximizing behavior of 
individuals); Posner, supra note 140, at 1551 (defining "rationality" as 
"choosing the best means to the chooser's ends"). Neo-classical economic 
theory ascribes an additional characteristic to the individual: he or she has stable 
preferences, which are elementary desires such as health and sensual pleasure. 
Becker, supra note 133, at 5. The assumption of health as a stable preference 
appears to be a limiting, if not problematic, aspect of the economic 
understanding of the world. Not all individuals resist or fear death, but accept, if 
not embrace, it—for example, as a stage in life. That is, for some individuals, 
there is a "time to die." For a starting point for reflection on this position, one 
might begin with the Katha-Upanishad. See 2 THE UPANISHADS 1-24 (F. Max 
Muller trans., Dover 1962) (1884). (It is perhaps necessary to note that the 
attitude toward death referenced here should not be confused with the existence 
of a preference that conflicts with an interest in health. For a discussion of the 
latter point, see Becker, supra note 133, at 9-10.) 
159  As a matter of neo-classical economic theory, at least in some forms, 
these choices need not be fully informed, nor need they be consciously made. 
Becker, supra note 133, at 6-7. 
160 See, e.g., Dr. Anita Dancs, The Opportunity Cost of War, 
TOMPAINE.COMMON SENSE, Sep. 28, 2006, 
http://www.tompaine.corn/articles/2006/09/28/the_opPortunity_cost_of  war.php 
(last visited Feb. 6, 2010). 
161 See, e.g., Jonathan Cohn, Cost Benefit: Will you pay more for health 
insurance under the current Senate Bill?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 8, 2009, 
hup://www.tnr.com/article/health-care/cost-benefit  (last visited Feb. 6, 2010). 
162 A conspicuous example of the American embrace of efficiency arguably 
lies in its increased privatization of military engagement. For one news account 
of this phenomenon, see James Glanz, Contractors Outnumber U.S. Troops in 
Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2009, at A10. 
163  Most, if not all, objects of interest are, in relative terms, scarce. 
Accordingly, the world is characterized by "scarce resources," each of which, as 
such, has value to some individual or group of individuals. Relative scarcity 
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in terms of their interest-based value, and, accordingly, the range 
of things that fall into the category "objects of interest" is 
unlimited. This disposition is perhaps best reflected in what are, by 
traditional measures, rather unique understandings that Americans 
have about certain aspects of lived experience, as well as toward 
what counts as an appropriate article for attainment. For example, 
entering into and remaining in marriage is often approached in just 
this way.164 Meanwhile, another's bodily organ is arguably a 
"thing to be acquired,"165 as is his or her body itself (regardless of 
the use to which it is to be put).166 Indeed, another's life is an item 
to be obtained, as Larry Summers somewhat famously noted.167 
Similarly, the elements of the natural environment are, without 
exception, potential articles for human intake. r68 
Finally, markets exist.169 Markets are and serve to coordinate 
the actions of rationally maximizing individuals, specifically via a 
should not be confused with physical scarcity. For an introductory discussion of 
the economic conception of relative scarcity, see COLE & GROSSMAN, supra 
note 37, at 2. See also 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 
253-54 (1987). 
164 For some academic treatments of marriage, and more broadly the family, 
in neo-classical terms, see, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 
(1981) and POSNER, supra note 37, at 143-66. 
165 For a reading that explores, in part, a market-based approach to kidney 
exchange, see WHEN ALTRUISM ISN'T ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR COMPENSATING 
KIDNEY DONORS (Sally Sate! ed., 2008). For a Congressional hearing that 
begins to explore a more market-based approach to the exchange of body 
organs, see Assessing Initiatives to Increase Organ Donation: Hearing Before 
the H. Subcom. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 108th Cong. 51-57, 64-67 (2003) (statements of Rich DeVos, Dr. 
Robert Sade, and Dr. Francis Delmonico). 
166 Richard Posner has suggested the economic logic of medical 
experimentation on convicted felons in exchange for elimination of prison time. 
See Richard Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757, 778 
(1975). 
167 Let Them Eat Pollution, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 8-14, 1992, at 66 
(reprinting memo of then World Bank Chief Economist Larry Summers stating 
that "the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest 
wage country is impeccable"). 
168 For a critique of the economic position vis-a-vis the natural environment, 
see MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT (2d ed. 2008) (arguing that the application of economic concepts 
in the valuation of the natural environment is a category mistake). 
169 Becker, supra note 133, at 5. This is one point at which the traditional 
institutional economist is likely to object, emphasizing that the economy is 
inextricably linked to the state. For one expression of this position from an 
individual whose ideas have roots in traditional institutional economics, see 
ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW (1952). For an introduction to 
Hale's thought, see Warren J. Samuels, The Economy as a System of Power and 
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"pricing mechanism" that assigns a "market value" to objects of 
interest.170 Through this method of managing behavior, markets 
structure the interest-seeking behavior of individuals, and thus 
stabilize human action and interaction more generally. This 
element of the economic world finds its cultural expression in both 
generalized and detailed existential understandings that the 
individual in America embraces. On the side of the former, 
acknowledgement of the operation of the "invisible hand" is 
commonplace. On the side of the latter, markets are understood to 
be in place in a whole range of "sectors," from consumer 
electronics, to medical services, 171 to dating, I72  to crime. I73 
Taken together, these core concepts—(1) the individual makes 
rational decisions that maximize his or her self-interest, (2) 
everything is an object of interest, and (3) markets exist—paint a 
basic picture of the economic construction of the world. Before 
proceeding with a discussion of the normative demands that arise 
out this constellation of beliefs, however, a comment is necessary, 
both to better appreciate the foundational picture drawn and to help 
identify those normative demands. That comment concerns the 
economic conceptualization of the individual qua rational 
maximizer. More specifically, it pertains to a disposition toward 
the existential integrity of the individual that underlies this 
understanding of the acting subject and that has important 
consequences for the economic way of life. That disposition is 
characterized by a rejection of the ontological dignity of the self, at 
least in any appreciable sense. 
Its Legal Bases: The Legal Economics of Robert Lee Hale, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
261 (1973). 
IN There is a limiting circumstance, which is the instance of market failure. 
In this situation, the government or the firm takes the place of the market as the 
mechanism for coordinating behavior. On the firm as an alternative to the 
market, see RONALD H. COASE, The Nature of the Firm, in THE FIRM, THE 
MARKET AND THE LAW 33 (1988). 
171 See, e.g., Anemona Hartocollis, Offer to Take Over Ailing Hospital Stirs 
Outcry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2010 (quoting N.Y. State Department of Health 
official's description of financially troubled hospital as "not competitive within 
its market"). 
172 See, e.g., The Dating Market, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 2007, available 
at http://www.economist.corn/blogs/freeexchange/2007/03/the_dating_market  
(last visited Feb. 6, 2010) and Katherine Bindley, Banker Seeks Beauty: Must Be 
Upbeat Like the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2009. 
173 See, e.g., Robert H. Frank, A Smarter (and Cost-Efficient) Way to Fight 
Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2009 (noting that "[law] enforcement policy in the 
United States rests implicitly on the 'rational actor' model of traditional 
economics, which holds that people take only those actions whose benefits 
exceed their costs"). 
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As the conceptual emphasis on the maximization of self-
interest suggests, in the world of economics, what matters are 
interests themselves. Interests possess existential integrity. The 
individual is a sort of medium through which they gain expression. 
In this sense, the individual is epiphenomenal, defined by his or 
her inherently secondary nature. He or she does not stand on his or 
her own terms. He or she is not autonomous under any substantive 
understanding of the concept. The significance of the individual 
lies in his or her derivative relationship to the realization of desires. 
In the more technical vocabulary of the cultural practice, the 
individual is a "decision unit"174—a locus of calculation—and 
nothing more substantial in the nature of his or her being (such as a 
citizen or someone with personhood and intrinsic rights).175 
By any measure, this orientation toward the individual is 
radically formal. And one consequence of this orientation is that in 
the world of economics, the individual is never part of something 
that is larger than him or herself. Put slightly differently, he or she 
is never involved in a movement beyond the self. Quite simply, if 
the individual lacks existential integrity—if there is no substantive 
character to the self—then there is no self with which to engage the 
other and to get past. This state of affairs marks a distinctive 
feature of the economic way of life, and carries with it a particular 
implication that demands highlighting. Specifically, the economic 
mode of living is necessarily acommunal, and correspondingly 
ahistorical. The individual in the economic sphere of experience 
does not participate in a synergistic relationship. Accordingly, "the 
collective" of the economic world is an aggregation of interests, 
not an inter-individual project.176 Moreover, because the economic 
universe knows no space for community, its way of being has no 
historical dimension. Communities exist across time, and history is 
their story. Without the former, there cannot be the latter. In the 
world of economics, there can be, and is, only the present—a 
condition that the language of economics expresses quite well. For 
174 Becker, supra note 133, at 7. 
175 Paul Kahn captures the economic attitude toward the subject well when 
he describes its perspective on him or her as "a mere placeholder for interests, 
an intersection of vectors of desire." KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW, supra note 1, at 
24. The vocabulary of "citizen" and "personhood" belong, respectively, to the 
political and moral forms of experience. Supra note 95. 
176 For this reason, in the world of economics, the measure of the public 
good is the "size of the pie." See COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 37, at I 1 . 
Relatedly, under the neo-classical form of capitalism, the public good is 
understood to be best served by each individual pursuing his or her ends. 
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this way of life, the past is "sunk cost,"177 while the future is 
assessed in terms of its "present value."178 
The insight into economics' disposition toward the existential 
integrity of the individual, and its consequences for his or her form 
of living, helps further understanding of the basic portrait of the 
economic world. With this slightly more enhanced picture in hand, 
we can explicate the rudimentary normative demand that the 
cultural form of economics places on those who take up its form of 
being. That analysis centers around a fundamental difference 
among the three core elements, a difference that involves the fact 
of their prescriptive, and non-prescriptive, characters. 
As an initial matter, the economic conception of the individual 
qua rational maximizer, understood in light of the underlying 
orientation toward him or her as epiphenomenal, makes manifest a 
general standard by which to measure the propriety of the 
economic person's conduct. If the individual is fundamentally a 
secondary phenomenon—if he or she lacks autonomy and has no 
larger relationship to the world through which he or she moves—
then the end of action for the economic person can only be to 
fulfill the purpose for which the individual does exist. That is, the 
end of action for him or her is just the rationally maximizing 
behavior that defines economic man. Put slightly differently, and 
in the form of a sort of creed, the work of the economic person is 
to rationally maximize his or her interests. Of course, such a 
normative account is entirely consistent with the counterpoint to 
economics' orientation toward the individual as epiphenomenal—
namely, its embrace of the existential integrity of interests. If in the 
world of economics, interests have primacy, then their satisfaction 
must be the measure of conduct. 
At the same time as the economic conception of the individual 
qua rational maximizer gives rise to the broad demand to 
rationally-maximize interests, the other beliefs that lie at the core 
of the cultural form of economics do not provide additional 
behavioral prescriptions themselves. Rather, they define a sort of 
geography or landscape within which the economic person moves. 
The consequence of this circumstance is that the general 
instruction for action has no supplemental or sibling obligation. 
177 For a definition of sunk cost, see, e.g., THE MIT DICTIONARY OF 
MODERN ECONOMICS 415 (4th ed. 1991) ("[c]osts which cannot be recovered 
when a firm leaves an industry"). 
178 For a definition of present value, see id. at 340 ("[t]he worth of a future 
stream of returns or costs in terms of their value now"). For a more extended 
treatment of the concept, see 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS 947-50 (John Eatwell et al. eds. 1987). 
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The result of this situation, in turn, is the collapse of the normative 
demand to rationally maximize interests into the normative 
demand of the economic world. The individual is to rationally 
maximize his or her self-interest, and nothing more. 
In the context that the two other core beliefs define—that 
everything is an object of interest and that markets exist—this 
fundamental prescription leads to two concrete requirements, each 
of which is directed at one of the two stations that the economic 
person can occupy in an act of market exchange. As a buyer, the 
basic command to rationally maximize interests means just what it 
says: he or she is to attend to his or her desires—consume objects 
of interest—in the most optimal manner. Other considerations—for 
example, responsibility or loyalty—do not have relevance, at least 
to the extent that they conflict with interest maximization. As a 
seller, the normative demand takes on a slightly more complex 
character: he or she is to address the wants and needs of the 
buyer—to serve the person who is consuming—within the limits of 
his or her own interests. Again, other matters are not germane.179 
Economics dictates to the individual who embraces its form of 
living that he or she is to pursue self-interest in a rationally- 
maximizing way. Already, we can notice a contrast in fundamental 
ethical principles between the world of law and that of 
economics—between an emphasis on the People, rules of law and 
self-denial on the one hand, and the interests of the self on the 
other. To fully appreciate this difference in normative orientation, 
a specific discussion of the subject is useful. 
C. The Basic Normative Demands of Law and Economics in 
Juxtaposition 
A comparative inquiry into the basic normative demands of 
two cultural forms appropriately begins with a consideration of the 
"first" normative demand. Ultimately, internal to each cultural 
form, on whom or what is the focus of the participant's actions? 
X79 One might consider here the claim of Milton Friedman, who notably 
argued that the social responsibility of a corporation is, in essence, to increase 
profits. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962) ("In [a 
free] economy, there is one and only one social responsibility of business 
	 to 
use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long 
as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free 
competition, without deception or fraud."). See also Milton Friedman, A 
Friedman Doctrine TheSocial Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 13, 1970, at SM17. 
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Whom or what is he or she to serve? This aspect of a cultural 
form's normative character—the starting point of its 
construction—defines its essence. Accordingly, this aspect of a 
cultural form's normative character, in comparative perspective, 
captures the heart of the contrast that inevitably exists between the 
normative characters of any two forms of experience. With respect 
to the normative demands of law and economics, the relevant first 
principles are, as we have seen, that one is to serve the People and 
that one is to serve the self, or more precisely, the self's interests. 
Interrogated in juxtaposition, the differential natures of the two 
principles' prescriptions, and thus of the normative characters of 
the two cultural orders, at their centers, become evident. 
In terms of the behavior that each prescribes, and its associated 
character, the respective "first" normative demands differ in two 
principal ways. First, as a straightforward matter, the fact that (a) 
law demands that those who participate in its form of living adhere 
to the voice of We the People while (b) economics commands that 
those who embrace its mode of living address the interests of the 
self means that (c) the lawyer and the economic person have 
different objects of commitment. After all, the People and the 
interests of the self are hardly identical subjects of ethical focus. 
To be clear, this type of circumstance is not unique to the 
comparative assessment of legal and economic normativity. 
Participants in cultural practices will always have distinct objects 
of ultimate concern. Nonetheless, the existence of the differential 
normative condition highlights a bottom-line aspect of the contrast 
between legal and economic action: the lawyer and the economic 
person serve alternate masters. 
Second, and relatedly, the erotic character of that service 
differs pointedly. For the lawyer, because he or she is to attend to 
the wishes of the People, he or she is necessarily serving an 
"other." Meanwhile, for the economic person, because he or she is 
to attend to the desires of the self, there is no other involved. This 
difference, between action that is other-regarding and action that is 
not other-regarding, speaks directly to the meaningful nature of the 
associated experience: the movement beyond the self is always 
more compelling than the embrace of the self, which, as the 
practice of economics demonstrates, is in the end a denial of a 
substantive self in any serious form.I8°  
ISO The economic denial of the self-integrity of other-regarding action is 
best exemplified in its understanding of altruism as epiphenomenal. For a brief 
explanation of the economic position, see Posner, supra note 140, at 1557 
(appealing to "interdependent utilities" to explain altruism as a form of rational 
self-interest). For a summary discussion of "altruistic preferences and utilities," 
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If we move past the juxtaposition of first principles and explore 
the two other basic normative demands of law vis-à-vis 
economics' injunction that the individual rationally maximize his 
or her self-interest, I81 our appreciation of the differential normative 
characters of law and economics deepens. The appropriate locus of 
attention here is the concrete requirements associated with the 
respective normative demands. As we have seen, the prescription 
to respect particular rules of law translates into a variety of specific 
obligations for the lawyer, as does the command to not concern 
oneself with the specific character of any self. For the economic 
person, however, these same particular duties do not necessarily 
obtain. Indeed, with regard to each of the concrete requirements 
discussed in Subpart A—to not engage in acts of civil 
disobedience, to avoid filing pleadings that have no chance of 
success on their merits, to refrain from conduct that corrupts the 
practice of law, to follow rules of law in his or her own 
individualized behavior, to not choose one's clients, and to not 
engage a controversial political or ideological issue beyond 
contributing his or her expertise—the obligations on the economic 
person may, and sometimes always do, push in the opposite 
direction. Specifically, for him or her, appropriate behavior toward 
rules of law is a function of a cost-benefit analysis, which will 
dictate at times that he or she engage in civil disobedience, file 
meritless pleadings, corrupt the practice of law, and frustrate rules 
of law in his or her own behavior.182 Meanwhile, because the 
in "mathematical" terms, see 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS 85 (John Eatwell et al. eds. 1987). 
181 Because economics' first principle captures its entire ethics, in basic 
form, its first principle is the only one of relevance for purposes of this Article. 
182 At this point, a discussion of economics' orientation toward law is 
appropriate. From the perspective of economics, legal rules are prices for the 
individual actor. One breaks the law when the benefits outweigh the costs. The 
function of law is to establish prices that lead to efficient outcomes at the social-
aggregate level. MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 37, at 58. It is perhaps worth 
noting that economics recognizes that posited law is not always capable of 
performing this function and that individuals, in filling the gaps in law, may 
agree to contracts that produce inefficient outcomes, at the social-aggregate 
level, if not breached. In this circumstance, which is one where transactions 
costs relevant to the analysis are high, economics understands the role of courts 
to be to provide efficient remedies—specifically, money damages qua 
expectation damages—for breaches of contracts. (When transaction costs 
relevant to the analysis are low, economics' prescribed remedy is specific 
performance, i.e. de facto no breach.) For a basic overview of efficient breach 
analysis, see id. at 74-79. For purposes of this paper, the approach to legal rules 
as prices is manifested in the lawyer's understanding of sanctions as a cost. It 
may also be reflected in the client's desire to engage in behavior that 
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economic person is to acknowledge the various selves, not deny 
them, he or she is to choose his or her clients, and engage whatever 
issues he or she wishes. 
Ultimately, at the most basic level, the normative characters of 
law and economics are distinct. Necessarily then, the same 
condition holds true for the lawyer and the economic person. 
Fundamentally, to be one is not the same as being the other. For 
those who seek to understand the nature of legal practice, and 
lawyer identity, this state of affairs points to an important 
conclusion. If, at its core, the practice of law is not the practice of 
economics, then it is a mistake to understand the practice of law as 
a business. Similarly, if being a lawyer is not the same as being an 
economic person, then it is incorrect to approach him or her as a 
businessman or businesswoman.183 
IV. A FINAL COMMENT 
Acknowledging the inherent normativity of law leads us to re-
think our understanding of the fundamental nature of the legal 
order and our understanding of the lawyer's professional 
responsibility, a phenomenon that has given rise to the project of 
the cultural study of the lawyer. In addition to pointing us in these 
two intellectual directions, the recognition of law's normativity 
leads us along a third intellectual path, which involves the 
consideration of a particular quality of law, and more generally of 
any cultural form, that is associated with a cultural form's act of 
normative projection. That quality is a cultural form's "totalizing" 
approach to the self. 
contravenes the law (e.g. file meritless pleadings, engage in discovery abuse, or 
engage in tax evasion). 
1K3  While the rule of law remains a vibrant set of meanings for the citizen, it 
may also be a dying set of meanings. At least one reason for this condition is the 
fact that the rule of law represents a modern form of politics and we live in an 
age when modem forms of politics confront post-modern forms of politics. In an 
important article, Russell Pearce offers the provocative argument that law is a 
business, grounding his position in a claim of a paradigm shift in the 
understanding of the nature of legal practice—specifically, in a claim of the 
demise of the "Professionalism Paradigm" and in a prediction of the emergence 
of a replacement paradigm, the "Business Paradigm." Russell G. Pearce, The 
Professionalism Paradigm: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve 
the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229 (1995). 
Pearce's argument appears tied to a post-modern form of politics and thus is not 
per se a challenge to the ideas expressed in this Article, but rather a location of 
the discourse in an alternate set of terms. 
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A cultural form maintains that it speaks to all aspects of human 
action and, seeking conformity with its ordering of behavior, a 
cultural form strives to make the individual who embraces its way 
of experience its own, in his or her entirety. That is, a cultural form 
makes a complete claim on the individual (and in this sense does 
not simply demand a behavioral practice from its adherent, as 
previously stated). This characteristic of a cultural form is hardly 
trivial. Rather, it points directly to the psychological and 
environmental forces that work on us, and, through those forces, to 
the great question of how we are to live our lives.184 What, then, 
are we to make of this fact about a cultural form? How are we to 
think about it? And, how are we to respond to it? 
At least one answer to this line of questions is that we must 
maintain self-awareness in the face of this reality. We must keep 
conscious of how a cultural institution operates on us, and thus 
what it does to us. If we lose sight of such understanding, we will 
inevitably lead an unhealthy life, because the totalizing character 
of a cultural form is also a pathology of a cultural form.185 It 
distorts human experience, and thus is not true to that experience. 
This condition is a consequence of a cultural form's inherently 
singular constructive vision. Although a cultural form affords a 
complete ordering of life, such a construction is, by definition, 
one-dimensional. The ordering of life is necessarily of the type of 
the cultural form. If the cultural form is political in nature, then its 
structuring of experience is also political. Similarly, if the cultural 
form is scientific, then so is the nature of its way of being. Life, 
however, is not one-dimensional. Man is a multi-faceted creature: 
political, scientific, religious, artistic, etc. For the individual to 
embrace a way of being that speaks to only one axis of experience 
is for him or her to move within a world that does not track well 
with the reality of human existence. It is, in this way, to live only a 
partial life, and consequently to pervert the whole of life. 
184 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, supra note 22, at 352d. 
185 As others have noted, ensuring that we maintain self-awareness is the 
ethical task of philosophy. See, e.g., ERNST CASSIRER, The Concept of 
Philosophy as a Philosophical Problem, in SYMBOL, MYTH, AND CULTURE: 
ESSAYS AND LECTURES OF ERNST CASSIRER 1935-1945, 49-63 (Donald Phillip 
Verene ed., 1979) and DONALD PHILLIP VERENE, Introduction to THORA ILIN 
BAYER, CASSIRER'S METAPHYSICS OF SYMBOLIC FORMS 28-37 (2001) 
(describing the normative dimension of Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic 
Forms). Recognizing this fact is one element of the response to those who argue 
that philosophy doesn't matter. For the claim of the inconsequential nature of 
philosophy, see Stanley Fish, Truth but No Consequences: Why Philosophy 
Doesn't Matter, 29 CRITICAL INQUIRY 389 (2003). 
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If we turn our attention to contemporary American society, just 
this type of circumstance appears to characterize its style of living. 
Today, the perspective of economics is more and more coming to 
dominate American psychology and, in so doing, to displace the 
American's appreciation for other dimensions of human 
experience. Increasingly, in traditionally non-economic sectors, 
Americans relate to the world through the framework of "the 
market." We see this condition manifest itself, for example, in the 
American approach to many of the country's important social 
institutions. Universities, health care establishments, and the press, 
to name just some of the relevant actors, are largely treated as 
economic players,186 despite the fact that they should not be 
understood in this way. Fairly considered, these organizations do 
not engage in the production of commodities.187 Their 
contributions to society lie in a direction other than that of 
economics—in the realm of art, science, politics, morality, etc. By 
orienting itself toward these social institutions via the conceptual 
vocabulary of economics, American society misconceives their 
basic purpose, and, accordingly, takes up a sort of "false" 
existence—a condition that is inherently destructive (and not only 
in non-material ways, as recent events in the American financial 
system highlight). 
Ernst Cassirer notably stated that man is a symbolic creature.188 
Cultural forms are the medium through which human beings 
organize a broad reality for themselves. This fact of human 
existence allows, in part, for the possibility of an enriching and 
ultimately uplifting life. At the same time, however, it carries with 
it the potential for a more negative way of being. As a society, we 
must be mindful of undesirable possibilities, and guard against 
them. If we fail to do so, we are the ones who suffer. 
186  For some readings on the treatment of the university as an economic 
enterprise, see, e.g., DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE 
COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2004); DAVID KIRP, 
SHAKESPEARE, EINSTEIN, AND THE Borrom LINE: THE MARKETING OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION (2004) and FRANK DONOGHUE, THE LAST PROFESSORS: THE 
CORPORATE UNIVERSITY AND THE FATE OF THE HUMANITIES (2008). For reading 
on the press, see TOM FENTON, BAD NEWS: THE DECLINE OF REPORTING, THE 
BUSINESS OF NEWS, AND THE DANGER TO US ALL (2005). 
187  The term commodity" should be understood in the Marxian sense. See 
THE MARX-ENGELS READER, supra note 137, at 302-29 (selected portions of 
KARL MARX, CAPITAL VOL. 1). 
188 CASSIRER, AN ESSAY ON MAN, supra note 8, at 26 (defining man as 
"animal .symbolicum"). 
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